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Abstract
The paper presents a model of housing and credit cycles featuring distorted beliefs
and comovement and mutual reinforcement between house price expectations and price
developments via credit expansion/contraction. Positive (negative) development in
house prices fuels optimism (pessimism) and credit expansion (contraction), which in
turn boost (dampen) housing demand and house prices and reinforce agentsoptimism
(pessimism). Bayesian learning about house prices can endogenously generate self-
reinforcing booms and busts in house prices and signicantly strengthen the role of
collateral constraints in aggregate uctuations. The model can quantitatively account
for the 20012008 U.S. boom-bust cycle in house prices and associated household debt
and consumption dynamics. It also demonstrates that allowing for imperfect knowledge
of agents, a higher leveraged economy is more prone to self-reinforcing uctuations.
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At some point, both lenders and borrowers became convinced that house prices would
only go up. Borrowers chose, and were extended, mortgages that they could not be expected
to service in the longer term. They were provided these loans on the expectation that
accumulating home equity would soon allow renancing into more sustainable mortgages.
For a time, rising house prices became a self-fullling prophecy, but ultimately, further
appreciation could not be sustained and house prices collapsed. (Bernanke (2010))
1 Introduction
The recent decade has witnessed a massive run-up and subsequent collapse of house prices,
as well as the remarkable role of the interaction of housing markets and credit markets in
aggregate uctuations in the U.S. economy. Real house prices increased considerably in
the decade before the recent nancial crisis, as seen in the upper panel of gure 1.1 They
displayed relatively smaller variability before the year 2000 and increased by 35:9% from
2001 to 2006 in which house prices peaked. Associated with the price boom was a sharp
increase in the household credit market debt/GDP ratio2 and a consumption boom. As
can be seen from the lower panel of gure 1, the household credit market debt/GDP ratio
changed moderately before the year 2000 but increased from 45% in 2001 to 70% in 2006.
Aggregate consumption3 grew at about 3% per annum between 2001 and 2006, while its
growth dropped sharply after house prices started to revert, as shown in gure 2.
A number of recent research document over-optimistic expectations about the future path
of house prices and the comovement between the expectations and house price developments
during the housing boom preceded the nancial crisis. Cheng, Raina and Xiong (2014)
study personal home transaction data of the mid-level Wall Street managers in securitized
nance both on the buy and sell side, which is supposed to reveal their beliefs about the
path of house prices. They document that the securitization agents held over-optimistic
beliefs about future house prices and call for serious considerations of the role of beliefs
in the nancial crisis and the macroeconomic implications of their belief dynamics. Case,
Shiller and Thompson (2012) document over-optimistic expectations of home buyers using
the Case-Shiller home buyer survey implemented at four metropolitan areas of the U.S..
Based on the data from Michigan Survey of Consumers, Piazzesi and Schneider (2009) nd
that the optimism in the housing markets, i.e., the share of agents believing prices to
increase further, co-moved positively with the house price level and peaked exactly when
house prices reached its peak.
Deriving house price forecasts from the future markets for the Case-Shiller house price
index (where only the data from 2006 onwards are available), Gelain, Lansing, and Mendicino
(2013) nd the comovement and mutual reinforcement between agents pessimistic price
1The data is taken from the OECD. Its denition is the national wide single family house price index.
The real house price index is the nominal house price index deated by CPI price index. It is normalized to
a value of 100 in 2000. The price-to-rent ratio and price-to-income ratio display a similar pattern.
2The household credit market debt/GDP ratio is measured by the absolute value of the ratio of net credit
market assets of US household and non-prot organizations to GDP. The data is from the Flow of Funds
Accounts of the U.S. provided by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
3The data is from Federal Reserve System. It is the Real Personal Consumption Expenditures (series ID:
PCECC96).
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Figure 1: US Real House Prices and Household Credit Market Debt/GDP
beliefs and price realizations during the house price reversal, in particular, the future market
tends to overpredict future house prices when prices are falling and persistent one-sided
forecast errors.
The paper develops a model of housing and credit cycles with a housing collateral con-
straint à la Kiyotaki and Moore (1997, henceforth KM) but incorporating an explicit role
for subjective beliefs consistent with the evidence in the work mentioned earlier. The model
can quantitatively account for the 20012008 U.S. boom-bust cycle in house prices and as-
sociated debt and consumption dynamics following the strong fall in real interest rates after
the year 2000.
In the model agents know their own objective, constraints and beliefs but have imper-
fect knowledge about the macroeconomy, such as other agentspreferences and prices beliefs
unlike in the standard Rational Expectations (RE) modeling. Relaxing such informational
assumption leads to agentsuncertainty about the equilibrium mapping between fundamen-
tals (e.g. preference shocks, house holdings) of the economy and house prices, which is
similar to that economists appear to be uncertain about the right model governing house
prices. Following Adam and Marcet (2011), agents are assumed to be Internally Rational,
i.e., making optimal decisions under a completely specied and dynamically consistent sub-
jective belief system about all payo¤-relevant variables, including house prices. Internally
rational agents do not understand how market prices are formed, so their subjective price
beliefs need not be exactly the same as the objective price density as under RE. Yet their
subjective beliefs are near-rational or close to the RE equilibrium beliefs. Optimal decisions
imply that agents apply Bayeslaw to equilibrium outcomes.
The Bernanke quotation before the Introduction can be viewed as a rough statement of
the mechanism of the model and more details are as follows. The trigger of the price boom
in the model is the persistently low interest rates after the year 2000. Responses of prices
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Figure 2: US Real Consumption Growth
and quantities in the model are drastically amplied due to the comovement and mutual
reinforcement between agentsexpectations and house price developments via credit expan-
sion/contraction. Positive development or surprise in house prices brings about agentsbelief
revision and optimistic expectations. Optimism about future house prices induces credit ex-
pansion, which in turn boosts housing demand and house prices. The realized house prices
partially validate the optimism, which leads to further optimism and persistent increases
in house prices. Associated with the price boom is a widening household credit market
debt/GDP ratio due to rising collateral values. Production and consumption amplication
arise from shifts of collateral to more productive borrowers.
At some point, house prices will fall short of agentsexpectations due to the combina-
tion of rising interest rates and endogenous dynamics, i.e., the dominance of the negative
e¤ect of excessive debt repayments. 4This sets a self-reinforcing decline in motion. Agents
revise their belief downward and become pessimistic about future house prices and collateral
values, which contracts lending, housing demand and house prices. The realized prices rein-
force agentspessimism and leads to further pessimism, inducing periods of persistent and
downward adjustments of beliefs and actual prices.
Consistent with Adam, Marcet and Nicolini (2011),5 the paper emphasizes the role of
the persistently low interest rates in the house price boom. Another policy implication of
the paper is that a higher leveraged economy is more prone to self-reinforcing uctuations
allowing for imperfect knowledge about asset prices. Increasingly optimistic price beliefs
endogenously enhance borrowing capacity, so that the drag of debt repayments based on
less optimistic past beliefs on house prices becomes relatively smaller. The positive e¤ect of
the relative reduction of the debt burden on house prices will be su¢ ciently large when the
leverage ratio is su¢ ciently large, so that realized house prices will be su¢ ciently large and
can reinforce agentsoptimism. Similarly for increasingly pessimistic beliefs. Simulations
4More generally than this particular episode, house price reversal in the learning model can be due to
policy changes, or exogenous changes in fundamentals, or endogenous dynamics, or a mix of them.
5Section 4.4.1 provides a detailed discussion of the relation of the paper to Adam, Kuang and Marcet
(2011).
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show that the amplication of house prices and quantities responding to the interest rates
changes in the learning model relative to RE is non-linear and increasing in the leverage
ratio of the economy.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1.1 reviews related literature.
Section 2 presents the model and agents optimality conditions. Section 3 discusses the
equilibrium with imperfect knowledge, belief specication and optimal learning behavior of
agents. The mechanism of the learning model is inspected in section 4. Quantitative results
and further intuition of the learning model are presented in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
1.1 Related Literature
A strand of literature has studied the role of collateral constraints as an amplication mech-
anism transforming relative small shocks to the economy into large output uctuations, such
as KM, Kocherlakota (2000), Cordoba and Ripoll (2004), Iacoviello (2005) among others.
More recently, a number of papers along this line attempt to understand the recent house
price dynamics and its macroeconomic implications, such as Ferrero (2011), Justiniano, Prim-
iceri, and Tambalotti (2014), and Ho¤mann, Krause and Laubach (2012). The model can
generate additional non-fundamental price uctuations and strengthen the role of collateral
constraints by allowing for agentsuncertainty about the equilibrium mapping.
Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013) nd housing demand shocks in their model with land collateral
constraints as the major driving force of land price uctuations. Learning may be viewed as a
structural interpretation of such shocks. Boz and Mendoza (2013) study the role of learning
about the riskiness of a new nancial environment. Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2011)
present a model in which a temporary house price boom emerges from infectious optimism
that eventually dissipates once investors become increasingly certain about fundamentals.
Iacoviello and Neri (2010) estimate a DSGEmodel with a housing collateral constraint via
Bayesian methods using data from 1965 to 2006. They nd an important role of monetary
factors in housing cycles over the whole sample and an increasing role during the recent
housing cycle. In addition, they nd a nonnegligible spillover e¤ect from housing markets
to consumption over the whole sample and increasing importance of the e¤ect in the recent
housing cycle. The transmission mechanism of the model is consistent with their ndings.
The paper relates to the literature which explores the role of self-referential learning in
business cycle uctuations but di¤ers by incorporating a specic form of nancial frictions.
For example, Eusepi and Preston (2011) present a business cycle model with learning which
improves the internal propagation of business cycle shocks and is consistent with many fea-
tures of observed survey expectations data. Huang, Liu and Zha (2009) study implications
of adaptive expectations in a standard growth model and nd them promising in gener-
ating plausible labor market dynamics. Milani (2011) estimates a New Keynesian Model
with adaptive learning incorporating survey data on expectations and nds a crucial role of
expectational shocks as a major driving force of the U.S. business cycle.
The paper is also related to papers which study the role of self-referential learning in asset
pricing or asset price booms and busts. For example, Timmermann (1996) and Carceles-
Poveda and Giannitsarou (2008) study asset pricing with learning in an endowment economy
and a production economy, respectively. While they nd a limited role of adaptive learning
in asset pricing, section 4.4.2 discusses why the role of learning is strengthened in a credit-
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constrained economy. Adam, Marcet, and Nicolini (2012) and Adam, Beutel, and Marcet
(2014) develop learning models which can quantitatively replicate several major stock pricing
facts, stock markets booms and busts and survey return expectations in the U.S.. Lansing
(2010) examines a near-rational solution to Lucas-type asset pricing models and learning
to generate intermittent stock bubbles and to match many quantitative features observed
in the long-run U.S. stock market data. Branch and Evans (2011) examine stock market
booms and crashes in an asset pricing model with learning about the conditional variance
of a stocks return. Gelain, Lansing and Mendicino (2013) study a DSGE model with a
housing collateral constraint and a subset of agents using moving-average rules to forecast
future house prices. They nd that this signicantly amplies the volatility and persistence
of house prices and household debt and examines various policy options to dampen the
excess volatilities.
2 The Model
The model builds on the basic version of the KM model with the major di¤erence of expec-
tation formation.
2.1 The Model Setup
There are two types of goods in the economy, durable assets, i.e., houses, and nondurable
consumption goods, which are produced using houses but cannot be stored. Following KM
and Iacoviello (2005), houses play a dual role: they are not only factors of production but
also serve as collateral for getting loans. Houses are modeled as a producing factor because
production activities usually need space. There are two types of innitely lived risk-neutral
agents, households and nancial intermediaries, each of which has unit mass. Both produce
and consume the nondurable goods. At each date t, there are two markets. One is a
competitive spot market in which houses are exchanged for consumption at a price of qt,
while the other is a one-period credit market in which one unit of consumption at date t is
exchanged for a claim to Rt units of consumption at date t+ 1.
The expected utility of a household i is
EP
i
0
1X
t=0
(B(i))tcBt (i) (1)
where B(i) is his subjective discount factor and cBt (i) his consumption in period t. The
operator EP
i
0 denotes household i
0s expectation in some probability space (
;S;P i), where 

is the space of payo¤ relevant outcomes that the household takes as given in his optimization
problem. The probability measure P i assigns probabilities to all Borel subsets S of 
. It
may or may not coincide with objective probabilities emerged in the equilibrium. Further
details about 
 and P i will be provided in the next section.
The household i produces with a constant return to scale technology. His production
function is
yBt+1(i) = (a+ e)H
B
t (i) (2)
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where HBt (i) is the amount of used houses. Only the aH
B
t (i) component of the output is
tradable in the market, while eHBt (i) is perishable and non-tradable. The introduction of
non-tradable output is to avoid continual postponement of consumption by households.
The households production technology is assumed to be idiosyncratic in the sense that
it requires his specic labor input. He always has the freedom to withdraw his labor, or in
the language of Hart and Moore (1994), the households human capital is inalienable. The
households are potentially credit-constrained. The nancial intermediaries protect them-
selves against risks of default by collateralizing the householdshouses. The household i can
at most pledge collateral (1  )EPjt qt+1HBt (i).6 Thus his borrowing constraint is
bBt (i)  (1  )
EP
j
t qt+1
Rt
HBt (i) (3)
where bBt (i) is the amount of loans, E
Pj
t qt+1 the nancial intermediary js expectation about
the collateral price in period t + 1, and Rt gross interest rate between t and t + 1. The
borrowing constraint says that a household can get a maximum loan which is equal to a
fraction of the discounted and expected liquidation value of his house holdings at t+ 1.
The household faces a ow-of-fund constraint
qt(H
B
t (i) HBt 1(i)) +Rt 1bBt 1(i) + cBt (i)  yBt (i) + bBt (i) (4)
He produces consumption goods using houses and borrows from the credit market. He spends
on consuming, repaying the debt, and investing in houses.
A nancial intermediary js preferences are specied by a linear utility function. She
maximizes the following expected utility
EP
j
0
1X
t=0
(L(j))tAtc
L
t (j) (5)
where Pj is her subjective probability measure and L(j) is her subjective discount factor.
At is an i.i.d innovation to the nancial intermediarys patience factor following a truncated
normal distribution with a bounded support [A;A] and E[At] = 1: She faces the following
budget constraint:
qt(H
L
t (j) HLt 1(j)) + bLt (j) + cLt (j)  yLt (j) +Rt 1bLt 1(j) (6)
where HLt (j) HLt 1(j) is her investment in collateral holdings. She uses a decreasing return
to scale technology to produce, i.e., yLt+1(j) = G
j(HLt (j)); where G
j0 > 0, Gj
00
< 0.
The aggregate supply of the collateral is assumed to be xed atH: Later I will assume that
all households (nancial intermediaries) have the same subjective discount factor B = B(i)
for 8i (L = L(j) for 8j) and households are less patient than nancial intermediaries, i.e.,
B < 
L
A
:
6If borrowers repudiate their debt obligations, lenders can repossess borrowers collateral by paying a
transaction cost proportional to the expected liquidation value of the collateral EP
j
t qt+1H
B
t (i): One expla-
nation is that debt enforcement procedures in real world are signicantly ine¢ cient and some value is lost
during such procedures, as documented by Djankov, Hart, Mcliesh and Shleifer (2008).
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2.2 Optimality and Market Clearing Conditions
Individual household i0s optimal decisions with respect to consumption, borrowing and col-
lateral demand are similar to those in the original KM paper. Since the return to investment
in collateral holding is su¢ ciently high,7 he prefers to borrow up to the maximum, con-
sume only the non-tradable part of his output and invest the rest in collateral holdings. His
optimal consumption is
cBt (i) = eH
B
t 1(i) (7)
and optimal borrowing
bBt (i) = (1  )
EP
j
t qt+1
Rt
HBt (i) (8)
The household uses both his own resources and external borrowing to nance collat-
eral holdings. Given that the household consumes only the non-tradable output, his net
worth at the beginning of date t contains the value of his tradable output aHBt 1(i); and
the current market value of the collateral held from the previous period qtHBt 1(i), net of
the debt payment, Rt 1bBt 1(i). The household is demand on collateral can be derived from
(2); (4); (7);and (8)
HBt (i) =
1
qt   1Rt (1  )EP
j
t qt+1
[(a+ qt)H
B
t 1(i) Rt 1bBt 1(i)] (9)
where qt   1RtEP
j
t qt+1 is the down-payment required to buy a unit of house.
Lagging equation (8) for one period yields the debt repayment at period t, Rt 1bBt 1(i) =
(1  )EPjt 1qtHBt 1(i), which is inuenced by the price expectation formed at period t 1, i.e.,
EP
j
t 1qt.
8 After plugging the debt repayment into (9), the collateral demand of the household
i is derived as follows
HBt (i) =
1
qt   1Rt (1  )EP
j
t qt+1
(a+ qt   (1  )EPjt 1qt)HBt 1(i) (10)
Note borrowerscollateral demand depends on expectations at two successive periods, EP
j
t 1qt
and EP
j
t qt+1 : the inherited debt repayment and the downpayment. The dependence gives
rise to interesting dynamics under learning, as analyzed later.
7Consider a marginal unit of tradable consumption at date t. The borrower could consume it and get
utility 1. Alternatively he could invest it in collateral holding and produce consumption goods. In the next
period, he will consume the nontradable part of production and invest further the tradable part, and so forth.
Similar to KM, an assumption, i.e., e
1  1R (1 )
(R 1)(1 )
aR >
1
B
 1; is made to ensure that the discounted sum
of utility of investing it at date t will exceed the utility of immediately consuming it (see Online Appendix
G), which is 1. Assumption B < 
L
A
ensures that the return to investment will also be larger than the
alternative choice, saving it for one period and then investing. Hence the collateral constraint will always be
binding.
The above argument is valid when the economy is in a neighborhood of the steady state under RE. Online
Appendix G shows that the collateral constraint is binding in the quantitative analysis of the learning model
when agentsexpectations are formed based on subjective beliefs.
8For the initial period R0bB0 (i) = (1  )EP
j
0 q1H
B
0 (i) is assumed to hold.
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A nancial intermediary j is not credit constrained and her demand for collateral is
determined by the following optimality condition
1
Rt
Gj
0  
HLt (j)

= qt   1
Rt
EP
j
t qt+1 (11)
For a marginal unit of collateral, the nancial intermediary could get 1
Rt
Gj
0  
HLt (j)

by
producing by herself. Alternatively, she can sell it, lend the proceeds to a household at
rate Rt, and buy it back in period t + 1 at the expected price EP
j
t qt+1; which gives her
qt   1RtEP
j
t qt+1: At the optimum, the two strategies give identical payo¤ at period t.
Note households are less patient than nancial intermediaries because B < 
L
A
. In
equilibrium the former will borrow from the latter and the interest rate will always be equal
to the nancial intermediariesrate of time preference; that is
Rt =
At
L
(12)
Assuming homogeneity among all borrowers and all lenders, symmetric equilibrium re-
quires HBt = H
B
t (i), H
L
t = H
L
t (j), b
B
t = b
B
t (i), and b
L
t = b
L
t (j). Aggregation yields
HBt =
R 1
0
HBt (i), H
L
t =
R 1
0
HLt (j), b
B
t =
R 1
0
bBt (i), and b
L
t =
R 1
0
bLt (j). Denote by yt the
aggregate output in period t; which is the sum of the production by borrowers and lenders
yt =
Z 1
0
yBt (i) +
Z 1
0
yLt (j) (13)
= (a+ e)HBt 1 +G(H
L
t 1) (14)
Market clearing impliesHBt +H
L
t = H and b
B
t = b
L
t : In equilibrium, user cost of collateral,
i.e., the opportunity cost of holding collateral for one more period, is
uet = qt  
1
Rt
EP
j
t qt+1
and equals to the present value of the marginal product of collateral.
Due to zero net supply of loans and collateral assets, aggregate consumption ct will equal
to aggregate output yt: Since aggregate investment is automatically zero in the model, I
introduce a xed, exogenous amount of autonomous investment following Boz and Mendoza
(2013). This captures the investment and government absorption in the data. So the GDP
in the model is the sum of aggregate consumption and investment
GDPt = ct + I (15)
Denote (Debt=GDP )t the household credit market debt/GDP ratio, which is calculated by
(Debt=GDP )t = b
B
t =GDPt (16)
Online Appendix A provides details on the steady state and the log-linearization of the
model.
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3 Equilibrium with Imperfect Knowledge
In the rational expectations equilibrium, agents are endowed with knowledge about the
equilibrium mapping from the history of collateral holdings and lenderspreference shocks
to collateral prices. Below I assume homogeneous expectations among all agents but relax the
assumption that the homogeneity of agents is common knowledge, in particular, agents do not
know other agentsdiscount factors and beliefs about future collateral prices. Relaxation
of the informational assumption leads to agents in the model being uncertain about the
equilibrium mapping between collateral prices and fundamentals.
3.1 The Underlying Probability Space and the Internally Rational
Expectation Equilibrium
I now describe the probability space (
;S;P). Following Adam and Marcet (2011), I extend
the state space of outcomes to contain not only the sequence of fundamentals, i.e., borrowers
collateral holdings and the shock to lenderspatience factor, but also other pay-o¤ relevant
variables: house prices. Both borrowers and lenders view the process for qt, At and HBt
as external to their decision problem and the probability space over which they condition
their choices is given by 
 = 
q  
A  
HB where 
X = 1t=0R+ and X 2 fq; A;HBg.
The probability space contains all possible sequences of prices, lenderspreference shocks
and borrowerscollateral holdings. Denote the set of all possible histories up to period t by

t = 
tq
tA
tHB and its typical element by !t 2 
t. The RE belief is nested as a special
case in which the probability measure P features a singularity in the joint density of prices
and fundamentals. Since equilibrium pricing functions are assumed to be known to agents
under RE, conditioning their choices on the collateral price process is redundant.
The agents are assumed to be Internally Rational9 as dened below, i.e., maximizing
their expected utility under uncertainty, taking into account their constraints, and condition-
ing their choice variables over the history of all external variables. Their expectations about
future external variables are evaluated based on their consistent set of subjective beliefs
specied in the subsequent subsection, which is endowed to them at the outset.
Denition 1 Internal Rationality
a) A household i is Internally Rationalif he chooses (bBt (i); H
B
t (i); c
B
t (i)) : 

t ! R3 to
maximize the expected utility (1) subject to the ow-of-fund constraint (4), the collateral
constraint (3) and his production function, taking as given the probability measure P i.
b) A nancial intermediary j is Internally Rationalif she chooses (bLt (j); H
L
t (j); c
L
t (j)) :

t ! R3 to maximize the expected utility (5) subject to the ow-of-fund constraint (6) and
her production function, taking as given the probability measure Pj.
Note the internal rationality of agents is tied neither to any specic belief system nor to
the learning behavior of agents. However, the belief system is usually specied with some
near-rationality concept and it is natural to introduce learning behavior of agents.
Below I specify the equilibrium of the economy. Let (
A;PA) be a probability space over
the space of histories of preference shocks 
A: Denote PA the objectiveprobability measure
9This follows Adam and Marcet (2011).
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for lenderspreference shocks. Let !A 2 
A denote a typical innite history of lenders
preference shocks.
Denition 2 Internally Rational Expectations Equilibrium
The Internally Rational Expectation Equilibrium (IREE) consists of a sequence of equilib-
rium price functions fqtg1t=0 where qt : 
tA ! R+ for each t, contingent choices (cBt (i); cLt (j); bBt (i);
bLt (j); H
B
t (i); H
L
t (j)) : 

t ! R6 and probability beliefs P i for each household i and Pj for
each nancial intermediary j, such that
(1) all agents are internally rational, and
(2) when agents evaluate (cBt (i); c
L
t (j); b
B
t (i); b
L
t (j); H
B
t (i); H
L
t (j)) at equilibrium prices, mar-
kets clear for all t and all !A 2 
A almost surely in PA.
In the IREE, expectations about collateral prices are formed based on agentssubjective
belief system, which are not necessarily equal to the objectivedensity. Collateral prices and
borrowerscollateral holdings are determined by equations (10), (11) and market clearing
conditions after agentsprobability measures P are specied.
3.2 AgentsBelief System and Optimal Learning Behavior
This section describes agents probability measure P and derives their optimal learning
algorithm. Agentsbelief system is assumed to have the same functional form as the RE
solution. They believe collateral prices and borrowerscollateral holdings depend on past
aggregate borrowerscollateral holdings.10 It can be represented as following:11
bqt = m + p bHBt 1 + t (17)bHBt = {m + {p bHBt 1 + %t (18)
given bHB0 ; where 
t
%t

 iiN

0
0

;

2 0
0 2%

(19)
Unlike under rational expectations, they are assumed to be uncertain about the para-
meters and the shock precisions (m; p; 1
2
;{m;{p; 1
2%
); which is a natural assumption given
that internally rational agents cannot derive the equilibrium distribution of collateral prices.
Note agentsbeliefs about ({m;{p; 1
2%
) do not matter for equilibrium outcomes because only
one-step ahead expectations about collateral prices enter the equilibrium under internal ra-
tionality in the model. So I omit belief updating equations for ({m;{p; 1
2%
) for the rest of
the paper.
10The shock to lenderspreferences is observable but not included in agentsregression. Including it will
generate a singularity in the regression if initial beliefs coincide with the rational expectations equilibrium
given it is the only shock in the model.
11This is analogous to learning the parameter linking prices and dividend in stock pricing models. Note the
dividend here is the marginal product of lenders and a function of borrowerscollateral holding. After log-
linearization, the (percentage deviation of) dividend is just a constant multiple of the (percentage deviation
of) the borrowerscollateral holding.
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Denote K the precision of the innovation t; i.e., K  12 . Agentsuncertainty at time
zero is summarized by a distribution
(m; p; K)  f
The prior distribution of unknown parameters is assumed to be a Normal-Gamma distribu-
tion as follows
K  G(0; d 20 ) (20)
(m; p)0 j K = k  N((m0 ; p0)0; (0k) 1) (21)
The residual precision K is distributed as a Gamma distribution, and conditional on the
residual precision K unknown parameters (m; p) are jointly normally distributed. The
deviation of this prior from the REE prior will vanish assuming agentsinitial beliefs are at
the RE value  =  = (m; p)0, and they have innite condence in their beliefs about the
parameters, i.e., 0 !1, and 0 !1.
For the sake of notational compactness, I denote yt and xt the collateral price bqt and
(1; bHBt 1) in the rest of this section; respectively. t  (mt ; pt ) stands for the posterior mean
of (m; p).
Given agentsprior beliefs (20) and (21), optimal behavior implies that agentsbeliefs
are updated by applying Bayeslaw to market outcomes. Online Appendix B shows that
the posterior distribution of unknown parameters is given by
Kj!t  G(t; d 2t ) (22)
(m; p)0jK = k; !t  N((mt ; pt )0; (tk) 1) (23)
where the parameters (mt ; 
p
t ; t; t; d
 2
t ) evolve recursively as following
t = t 1 + (xtx0t + t 1)
 1xt(yt   x0tt 1) (24)
t = t 1 + xtx0t (25)
t = t 1 +
1
2
(26)
d 2t = d
 2
t 1 +
1
2
(yt   x0tt 1)0(xtx0t + t 1) 1t 1(yt   x0tt 1) (27)
To avoid simultaneity between agentsbeliefs and actual outcomes, I assume information
on the data, i.e., prices and collateral holdings, is introduced with a delay in t.12 The
following learning rule using lagged data is used13
t = t 1 + (xt 1x0t 1 + t 1)
 1xt 1(yt 1   x0t 1t 1) (28)
t = t 1 + xt 1x0t 1 (29)
12Using current instead of lagged data in belief updating may give rise to multiple equilibria, i.e., high (low)
price realizations associated with optimistic (pessimistic) beliefs. This is a potentially interesting avenue to
explore asset prices boom and bust but is not pursued in the paper.
13A micro-founded belief system justifying the delay of information on the data can be provided following
Adam, Beutel and Marcet (2014).
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This timing convention is standard in the adaptive learning literature. Note while the fore-
cast functions are predetermined, because beliefs are updated using lagged data, agents
expectations are not predetermined as they depend on period t information.
Equations (28) and (29) are equivalent to the following Recursive Least Square (RLS)
learning algorithm
t = t 1 + gtS 1t xt 1(yt 1   x0t 1t 1) (30)
St = St 1 + gt(xt 1x0t 1   St 1) (31)
when the initial parameter is set to 0 = NS0 and where gt = 1t+N : Then it can be shown
that for subsequent periods we have t = (t + N)St, for 8t  1. Therefore, N in the above
equations measures the precision of initial beliefs.
The term yt 1   x0t 1t 1 in equation (30) is agents price forecast error at period t:
According to (30) and (31), a surprise in agentsprice expectation will induce a revision of
their beliefs or the parameters linking prices and fundamentals.
As standard in the literature, the learning rule with a small and constant gain sequence
gt = g > 0 is used in the quantitative exercise in section 5
t = t 1 + gS 1t xt 1(yt 1   x0t 1t 1) (32)
St = St 1 + g(xt 1x0t 1   St 1) (33)
A Bayesian micro-foundation for this learning algorithm is provided in Online Appendix C.
The learning rule (32)-(33) implies that agents discount past observations and give relatively
more weight to new data when they are alert to possible structural changes in the economy.
I rstly studies the condition under which the learning process under the decreasing
gain learning algorithm (30)-(31) converges towards the RE equilibrium or equivalently the
Expectational Stability (E-stability) condition. This is a precursor of meaningful dynamics
under the constant gain learning rule because the learning process under the constant gain
learning rule will converge in distribution to the REE if the E-stability condition is satised
and the gain parameter is su¢ ciently small. Note beliefs under the constant gain learning rule
will not converge pointwise to the RE belief because asymptotically agents will discount past
data and still revise their beliefs responding to forecast errors caused by random innovations.
4 Understanding the Learning Model
This section rstly provides intuitions on the role of subjective beliefs in determining house
prices in the model. It then examines the condition governing the convergence of the learn-
ing process and shows that a higher leveraged economy is more prone to self-reinforcing
uctuations. It closes with informal discussions of related papers.
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4.1 Dependence of House Prices on Subjective Beliefs
Log-linearizing borrowerscollateral demand (10) under symmetric equilibrium yields14
bHBt =  bqt   (1  )EPt 1bqt   bqt   1 R EPt bqt+11  1 
R
+ bHBt 1   1 R bAt 1  1 
R
 (34)
bHBt depends on expectations of two successive periods: EPt 1bqt and EPt bqt+1: The former arises
from debt repayments and the latter from down-payment.
Recall agents perceive prices to evolve according to (17); while their beliefs are updated
following (30) and (31): The state variables of the learning algorithm are xt = (1 bHBt 1)0.
Agentsconditional expectations are EPt 1bqt =  0t 1xt 1 and EPt bqt+1 =  0txt where t  (mt
pt )
0. Substituting the conditional expectations into the log-linearized version of equation
(11) and (34) under the symmetric equilibrium, I get the actual law of motion (ALM) for
collateral prices under learning
bqt = T1(mt 1; mt ; pt ) + T2(pt 1; pt ) bHBt 1 + T3(pt ) bAt (35)
where T2(
p
t 1; 
p
t ) =
( 1R 
p
t+
1

R 1
R )

1  1 
1  1 
R
pt 1

1 
1 
R
1  1 
R
pt
and 1

is the steady state elasticity of user cost
of collateral with respect to borrowerscollateral holdings.15 The analytical expression for
T1(
m
t 1; 
m
t ; 
p
t ) and T3(
p
t ) is presented in Online Appendix A.
The T-map maps agents subjective beliefs to the parameters in the ALM for house
prices under learning. The Minimum State Variables RE belief is the xed point of the
T-map satisfying T1(
m
; 
p
) = 
m
= 0 and T2(
m
; 
p
) = 
p
:16
Subjective beliefs p at period t   1 and t appear three times in the T2 map and their
e¤ects on house prices under learning are presented below. Online Appendix A.1 keeps track
of the three belief terms in deriving the T2 map.
First, the T2 map depends negatively on past beliefs pt 1 via debt repayment (see equa-
tion (34)). An increase in pt 1 raises borrowersdebt repayment (given borrowerscollateral
holdings bHBt 1) which in turn reduces their collateral demand and hence impacts negatively
on house prices. Second, pt associated with
1
R
in the T2 map comes from the expected
housing re-sale price in equation (11). A higher pt impacts positively on house prices be-
cause agents have more optimistic forecast functions. Third, pt associated with
1 
R
1  1 
R
in the
T2 map comes from the down-payment in the borrowershousing demand equation (34).
14This equation is useful for understanding the impulse response functions and discussed further in section
5.1.
15The elasticity is dened as
1

 d log u
e(HBt )
d logHBt
jHBt =HB =  
d logG0(HLt )
d logHLt
jHLt =HL 
HB
H  HB
It is the product of the nancial intermediariesmarginal product of collateral and the ratio of the households
collateral holdings to the nancial intermediariesat the steady state.
16The MSV RE solution for borrowerscollateral holdings and collateral prices are an AR(1) process and
ARMA(1,1) process, respectively and suppressed here.
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A higher pt or more optimistic belief relaxes the credit limit and hence raises borrowers
housing demand/holding. Increased borrowersdemand inuences house prices positively in
two ways. On one hand, recall agents use borrowershouse holding to forecast future house
prices, the rising borrowershouse holding boosts house price forecasts and prices. On the
other hand, the increased borrowershouse holding raises the lendersmarginal productivity,
user cost of collateral and house prices.
4.2 Expectational Stability of the REE
As the RE belief is the xed point of the T-map, so it is the rest point of the learning process.
This section examines the Expectational-Stability condition for the REE, which also governs
the convergence of the learning process towards the REE. This can be analyzed by applying
standard techniques elaborated in Evans and Honkapohja (2001). Denote  as the set of
admissible parameters in the RE and the learning model.
Denition 3
The admissible parameter space   f(;R; )j > 0; R > 1; 0   < 1g:
This implies that the steady state leverage ratio or loan-to-value ratio is in the interval
(0; 1
R
]; the elasticity 1

is positive, and the (net) interest rate is positive.
Local stability of the Minimum State Variable REE is determined by the stability of the
following associated ordinary di¤erential equations
dm
d
= T1(
m; p)  m
dp
d
= T2(
p; p)  p
The following condition establishes a su¢ cient condition for the E-stability of the Mini-
mum State Variable RE equilibrium.
Proposition 4
The MSV RE equilibrium for the economy is Expectationally-stable (E-stable) for all
admissible parameters in .
Proof. see Online Appendix D.
The following illustration may help to understand the E-stability condition. Fixing
agentsbeliefs about m at the RE value 0 and the price elasticity p above the RE value 
p
;
so agents have an excessively optimistic forecast function. Recall the three e¤ects discussed
in section 4.1. On one hand, a high p inuences negatively on house prices because agents
hold excessive debt repayment. On the other hand, a high p impacts positively on house
prices via two ways: excessively optimistic forecast function for housing re-sale price and
excessively optimistic expectations about collateral values and credit limits relative to RE.
The E-stability result says exactly that the negative e¤ect of the excessive debt repayment
will dominate for all admissible parameterizations. This in turn leads to a low realization of
the price elasticity which pushes agentsbelief downward. Therefore, the asymptotic local
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stability of the REE is achieved. Roughly speaking, given that the E-stability condition is
satised and the parameter estimates are around the neighborhood of the RE value, we have
t !  and t !1 almost surely.17
The above proposition also implies that parameter estimates coming from a constant
gain learning algorithm (32)-(33) will converge in distribution to the REE as long as the
gain parameter is su¢ ciently small.18
4.3 Dependence of Belief Dynamics on Loan-to-Value Ratio
House price changes display strong positive serial correlation at short time horizon, such
as one year, as shown by Case and Shiller (1989), and Glaeser and Gyourko (2006). How-
ever, standard full-information RE models, e.g., Liu, Wang, Zha (2013), typically can not
generate the degree of persistence of house price changes as in the data without relying on
very persistent exogenous shocks. This section shows that the learning model can inter-
nally display strong persistence in belief and price changes if the Loan-to-Value ratio of the
economy is su¢ ciently large. Put di¤erently, a higher leveraged economy is more prone to
self-reinforcing uctuations.
Following Adam, Marcet and Nicolini (2012), one way to capture the strong persistence
in the change of agentsbeliefs is by momentum dened below. Momentum in belief adjust-
ments is the key property for their asset pricing model replicating a number of equity pricing
facts in the U.S. data, such as the return volatility, the persistence and volatility of price
dividend ratio, etc.
Recall pt is agentsbelief about the price collateral holdings elasticity at period t, and 
p
the corresponding value at the RE level.
Denition 5 Momentum
Momentum is dened as:
(1) if pt > 
p
t 1 and 
p
t  p, then pt+1 > pt .
(2) if pt < 
p
t 1 and 
p
t  p, then pt+1 < pt .
The denition says following. Suppose agentsbelief or parameter estimate is adjusted
upward (downward), i.e., pt 1 < 
p
t (
p
t 1 > 
p
t ); but still not exceed (not below) the RE level,
i.e., pt  p (pt  p); this will be followed by further upward (downward) belief adjustment,
i.e., pt+1 > 
p
t (
p
t+1 < 
p
t ): Roughly speaking, agentsoptimism (pessimism) is followed by
further optimism (pessimism).
To study the internal dynamics of the learning model, a deterministic model is examined
by assuming bAt = 0 for all t. I further consider a simplied perceived law of motion without
learning about 
m
or the steady state, that is, bqt = pt 1 bHBt 1+!t. Recall the T-map mapping
from the subjective belief to the parameter in the actual law of motion is T2(
p
t 1; 
p
t ) =
17Once the convergence of agentsestimates in the collateral price process is achieved, agentsbelief about
the parameter estimates in the borrowerscollateral holding equation will also converge to the RE value.
18The convergence properties of learning models under the constant-gain learning algorithm are discussed
in details in Evans and Honkapohja (2001).
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( 1R 
p
t+
1

R 1
R )

1  1 
1  1 
R
pt 1

1 
1 
R
1  1 
R
pt
; which also determines critically the dynamics of the model with
learning about 
m
. Below I characterize a su¢ cient condition for the learning model to
display momentum in belief adjustments.
Substituting the actual law of motion for house prices, i.e., qt = T2(
p
t 1; 
p
t ) bHBt ; into
agentsbelief updating equations (30)-(31) or (32)-(33) yields
pt+1 = 
p
t + gtS
 1
t+1
bHBt (bqt   bHBt pt )
= pt + gtS
 1
t+1
 bHBt 2 (T2(pt 1; pt )  pt ) (36)
where gt can be the decreasing gain sequence or constant gain and is positive. AssumingbHBt 6= 0 below. Equation (36) says that agents will revise their belief about the price
elasticity upward (downward) if the realized price elasticity is higher (lower) than their
subjective estimate.
Performing the rst-order Taylor approximation of the T2 map around the REE belief
yields
T2(
p
t 1; 
p
t ) ' p +

  @T2
@pt 1
jp


p   pt 1

 

@T2
@pt
jp


p   pt

(37)
As explained in section 4.1, we know @T2
@pt 1
jp < 0 and @T2@pt jp > 0 . A past belief 
p
t 1
which is lower than the RE value implies a lower debt repayment (given collateral holdings)
relative to that under RE and contributes positively to the realized price elasticity. A current
belief pt which is lower than the RE value contributes negatively to the price elasticity.
To illustrate, consider a scenario in which agentsbelief arrives at the RE value from
below, i.e., pt 1 < 
p
t = 
p
: According to (37), the realized price elasticity will be larger than
the RE value, i.e., T2(
p
t 1; 
p
t ) > 
p
: The past belief lower than RE value implies a lower
debt repayment and helps to generate a high price elasticity. Furthermore, belief updating
rule (36) implies agents will revise their belief further upward, i.e., pt+1 > 
p
t . So there is a
tendency that agentsbelief will overshoot the RE value when arriving at the RE value. 19
This is true for any admissible parameterization of the model.
However, a stronger condition is needed for the learning model to display momentum in
belief adjustments when agentsbelief is updated upward but still below the RE value, that
is, pt 1 < 
p
t < 
p
: A su¢ cient condition20 to ensure momentum is
  @T2
@pt 1
jp 
@T2
@pt
jp (38)
The reason is as follows. Consider agents belief is updated upward but still below the
RE value, that is, pt 1 < 
p
t < 
p
: If the above condition holds, (37) implies that the price
19The magnitude of this further upward belief adjustment will depend on the size of the gain parameter.
Also note the property that agentsbeliefs hover around the RE value during the learning transition does
not conict with the convergence of agentsbelief under the RLS learning to the RE value.
20Note the set of parameters satisfying the momentum condition @T2
@pt 1
jp + @T2@pt jp  0 is a subset of the
set of parameters satisfying the E-stability condition @T2
@pt 1
jp + @T2@pt jp < 1:
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Figure 3: Threshold function 1 
R
( 1

) and parameter combinations generating momentum
collateral holdings elasticity in the ALM will be higher than the RE value, i.e., T2(
p
t 1; 
p
t ) >

p
: Using the realized price elasticity, agents will update their belief further upward according
to (36).
Note if  were 1 or equivalently the leverage ratio were zero, momentum would not arise
in the learning model. This is because past beliefs would not appear in the T2 map. (38)
would not be met because its left hand side would be zero and its right hand side positive.
There would not be an overshoot of agentsbelief because without a shock it would stay at
the RE value when arriving there. As we increase the leverage ratio above some threshold,
(38) will be met so that the positive e¤ect of a lower past belief or debt repayment will
dominate and the realized price elasticity will be su¢ ciently high and reinforce the initial
optimism.
The intuitions are summarized as follows. Increasingly optimistic price beliefs endoge-
nously enhance borrowing capacity, so that the drag of debt repayments based on less op-
timistic past beliefs on house prices becomes relatively smaller. The positive e¤ect of the
relative reduction of the debt burden on house prices will be su¢ ciently large when the
leverage ratio is su¢ ciently large, so that realized house prices will be su¢ ciently large and
can reinforce agentsoptimism. Similarly for increasingly pessimistic beliefs. This is shown
by the following proposition which provides an explicit characterization of the momentum
condition (38).
Proposition 6
A su¢ cient condition guaranteeing momentum in beliefs (around the neighborhood of
the REE belief) in the learning model is that parameter combinations of (;R; ) satisfy
1 
R
 1
g(R) 1

+1
where g(R) = R(
q
(R  1) + (R 1)2
4
+ R 1
2
):
Proof. see Online Appendix E.
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As an example, I set the gross quarterly interest rateR to 1.0088, which is the steady state
value of the interest rate I choose in the quantitative exercise later. The threshold steady
state loan-to-value ratio as a function of 1

; i.e, 1 
R
= 1
g(R) 1

+1
; is plotted, which is decreasing
in the elasticity 1

: The shaded area of gure 3; which is the area above the threshold function,
summarizes the parameter combinations (1 
R
; 1

) under which there is momentum in beliefs
in the learning model.21 As can be seen from this gure, momentum22 will arise in the
learning model when the elasticity of the user cost with respect to borrowers collateral
holdings is relatively large or the steady state leverage ratio is relatively large. Given the
elasticity 1

; the leveraged economy with a su¢ ciently high steady state leverage ratio can
display momentum in belief and price changes.
Online Appendix F provides a discussion of the robustness of the qualitative learning
dynamics with respect to an alternative specication of the collateral constraint that the
maximum loan borrowers can get is a fraction of the current instead of expected collateral
values.
4.4 Discussions
4.4.1 Relation to Adam, Kuang, and Marcet (2011, henceforth AKM)
AKM develop an open economy asset pricing model with a housing collateral constraint and
learning which quantitatively accounts for the heterogeneous G7 house prices and current
account dynamics over 2001-2008. In the AKM model, the price boom-bust is the conse-
quence of the dynamic interaction of only house prices and price beliefs. Feedback from
credit expansion/contraction to house prices, which is believed to have played a critical role
during the recent U.S. housing cycle, has been shut down in the AKM analysis.23 For ex-
ample, studying detailed zip code level data, Mian and Su (2009) suggest that there may
be a feedback mechanism between credit growth and house price growthand the evidence
cautions against treating house prices movements in the last decade as independent from
the expansion and collapse of subprime mortgage securitization.The current model fea-
tures dynamic interaction of house prices, price beliefs and credit limits and can capture this
important feedback.
Both AKM and the current model generate quantitatively signicant di¤erences from the
RE version of the models. For both models, the critical property is the dependence of house
prices on belief changes and hence the possibility of endogenously persistent belief and price
21The parameter combinations generating momentum in beliefs are not sensitive to a wide range of the
steady state value of the interest rate R chosen here.
22The parameterizations in the quantitative exercise later do not fall in the shaded area but very close to
the border of the threshold function. The persistence in agentsbeliefs and in collateral price changes can
still arise when the learning friction interacts with interest rate reductions.
23In AKM, price uctuations a¤ect the collateral values of domestic households, borrowing, and current
account dynamics. Relaxation and tightening of credit limits have an e¤ect on the borrowers housing
demand but no impact on the house price dynamics in the approximate solution. The latter is because the
marginal product of houses (tG
0(Ht)) is kept constant in the quantitative analysis and hence the collateral
demand function is horizontal. No feedback from credit limits to house prices is evident by inspecting the
key equations of the learning model in AKM, i.e., the belief updating equation (33) and the actual law of
motion for house prices (35).
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changes. The improvement in the t of the model here arises from the intrinsic property of
a collateral-constrained economy that prices are directly inuenced by past beliefs via debt
repayment, contrast to from learning about the permanent component of house price growth
in AKM.
Di¤erent from AKM, the paper also analyzes the role of leverage ratio, convergence of the
learning process, and studies the dynamics of household debt and aggregate consumption
quantitatively.
4.4.2 Relation to some asset pricing models with adaptive learning
Timmermann (1996) and Carceles-Poveda and Giannitsarou (2008, henceforth CG) study
asset pricing with adaptive learning in an endowment economy and a production economy
without collateral constraints, respectively. They nd a limited role of adaptive learning in
asset pricing when agents learn about the parameters linking asset prices to fundamentals or
dividends. As analyzed in section 4.3, the asset pricing equation in a collateral-constrained
economy di¤ers critically from those in the two papers. Asset prices in the model are directly
inuenced by past beliefs and hence by the change of agentsprice beliefs. This opens the
possibility for the learning model to display strong persistence in belief changes and larger
uctuations of prices and quantities even if a similar belief specication as them is considered,
i.e., agents learn about the parameters linking house prices and fundamentals or dividends.
In contrast, in Timmermann (1996) and CG, when agentsbeliefs arrive at the RE beliefs,
they will stay there without further realizations of shocks.
CG follow the Euler-equation (EE) learning approach, replacing expectation terms in
agentsrst-order conditions by those formed by adaptive learning. Preston (2005) shows
that the decision rule under EE learning approach leads to suboptimal decisions in a New
Keynesian model. In standard real business cycle models, Eusepi and Preston (2011) suggest
that such learning approach is unlikely to be helpful in explaining quantitative features of
macroeconomic dynamics. The suboptimality is generally true in many standard models but
disappears in some specic settings, for example, if agentspreferences are risk-neutral as in
the current model or in the model of Adam and Marcet (2011). Agentsoptimal decisions
are fully characterized by Euler equations, which is the same as under the EE learning. The
more signicant role of learning in asset pricing in the current model relative to Timmermann
(1996) and CG arises not from the internal rationality approach but from leveraging and
borrowing constraints particularly in a relatively high leveraging regime.24
24The optimal decisions under internal rationality will be di¤erent from decisions by agents under the
EE learning if the risk-neutrality assumption is replaced by risk-aversion. The former requires that agents
forecast house prices up to the indenite future. Risk-aversion is quantitatively less important relative to
learning as asset prices are mainly driven by expectations, as can be seen the stock pricing in model of Adam,
Marcet, and Nicolini (2012). Solving a model with internal rationality and risk-averse agents requires more
sophisticated numerical methods as agents make their forecasts based on the subjective density instead of
the point subjective belief and up to innite horizon. The Adam, Beutel and Marcet (2014) model of stock
market booms and busts is such an example.
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5 Quantitative Results and Further Mechanism
The learning model is estimated to the U.S. economy showing that the learning model
can quantitatively account for the recent house prices boom and bust and the associated
household debt and aggregate consumption dynamics. Around the year 2001, the U.S. real
interest rate dropped considerably and stayed low for an extended period of time, before
rising again around the year 2006. The average of 1-year ahead ex-ante real mortgage
interest rates25 from 1997Q1 to 2000Q4 was 3.51%, while the average of real interest rates
between 2001Q1-2005Q4 was 2.28%.
The following experiment is conducted. Initially the economy is assumed to be at the
steady state and agentsbeliefs at 2000Q4 are set to the RE value.26 The low real interest
rates after 2000Q4 and the subsequent increase are captured in the following stylized way.
The annualized real interest rate at the steady state is set to 3.51%. I let the interest rate fall
from 2001Q1, stay unchanged at 2.28% until 2005Q4, and then go back to the steady state.
The model is used to generate real house prices, consumption and debt/GDP ratio during
2001Q1-2008Q4. Following Campbell (1994), I set the steady state consumption-GDP ratio
to 0.745.
Denote by ck the product of the productivity gap (a+e) G
0
(a+e)
and borrowersproduction
share (a+e)H
B
Y
in aggregate output. The gain parameter g, the elasticity 1

; the parameter
 ; and the parameter ck; are chosen to minimize the absolute distance between the learning
model generated and actual house prices, consumption and debt/GDP ratio as follows
2008Q4X
t=2001Q1
 
jbqt   bqtj
std(bqt) + jbct   bctjstd(bct) + j \Debt=GDP t   \Debt=GDPtjstd( \Debt=GDPt)
!
where boldface letters denote actual data and std stands for standard deviation.
The minimization yields that g = 0:065; 1

= 2:46;  = 0:45; and ck = 0:43. This choice of
 implies that the steady state loan-to-value ratio is 0:54.27 The value of ck implies roughly,
say both the productivity gap and borrowersproduction share are 2
3
:28The choice of the
parameters yields impulse response functions of the learning model broadly consistent with
other studies.29 The parameterization of the RE models is the same as the estimated learning
model.
25The mortgage rate used is the one-year adjustable rate mortgage average in the United States from
Freddie Mac (seriesID: MORTGAGE1US). The ex-ante real interest rate is calculated as the mortgage rate
minus the median expected 1 year ahead CPI ination rate from the survey of professional forecasters.
26An analogy can be made between the perceived law of motion used by the agents in the model and
learning house price-to-rent ratio because the regressor bHBt is a constant multiple of the (log-linearized)
dividend of houses. The assumption of RE belief as the initial belief is based on the observation that the
house price-to-rent ratio is relatively stable say from 1980s to 2000. So agents are assumed to have learned
to form RE.
27This is consistent with the estimate of the household loan-to-value ratio by Iacoviello (2005) with mean
0.55 and standard deviation 0.09.
28The productivity gap of 23 is also considered by Cordoba and Ripoll (2004).
29Iacoviello and Neri (2010) nd that 1% positive i.i.d. monetary policy shock leads to a decrease of house
prices by about 0.65% and hump-shaped response of consumption with the trough 0.5% below the steady
state.
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Recall the interest rate at period t in my model is Rt = AtL : To get low interest rates
during 2001-2005, I assume lendersdiscount factors L shift upward exogenously during
2001-2005 and back to their old value during 2006-2008.30
Under RE, two alternatives are considered: the interest rate movement is either unantici-
pated or anticipated. Model predictions for the two alternatives are provided below. RE-I
model refers to the RE model with unexpected interest rate reductions, while RE-IImodel
stands for the RE model with anticipated interest rates movement. Note the performance of
the learning model will be the same under either of the two assumptions because expecta-
tions about future interest rates do not enter the system of equations governing the model
economy.
5.1 Response to 1% unexpected interest rate reduction
RE dynamics. Figure 4 depicts the responses to an unexpected interest rate reduction. In
the impact period, real house price under RE rises by about 1.2%, while consumption and
debt/GDP ratio rise by about 0.6% and 2%,31 respectively. However, they do not rise further
after the interest rate reduction disappears. Consumption decays exponentially, while the
house price drops substantially due to the disappearance of the interest rate reduction and
then converges persistently to the steady state.
Under rational expectations, borrowerscollateral demand increases following an unex-
pected interest rate reduction. In the impact period, collateral is transferred from lenders to
borrowers. Due to the xed supply of collateral and the concave technology of lenders, user
cost of collateral rises above its steady state value. Since borrowerscurrent investment in
collateral holding raises their ability to borrow in the next period, there will be persistence
in their collateral holdings. The user cost of collateral stays above the steady state for many
periods. Under RE, house prices are the discounted sum of current and future user cost.
The persistence in user cost reinforces the e¤ect on house prices and collateral values, which
leads to a larger e¤ect on collateral transfers and aggregate activities.
After the disappearance of the interest rate reduction, the user cost rises above the
steady state, which chokes o¤ further rises in borrowershousing demand. House prices and
borrowerscollateral holdings will revert immediately towards the steady state. Prices and
quantities converge persistently and monotonically to the steady state.
Learning dynamics. The response of the learning model is simulated by setting the
initial belief to the RE value. Learning generates additional propagation of the interest rate
reduction due to belief revisions and the dynamic interaction between price beliefs, credit
limit and price realizations. The peak responses of house prices, consumption and debt/GDP
ratio are 1.2%, 0.73%, and 2.3%, respectively. The learning model also generates positive
persistence in forecast errors,32 as can be seen from the lower right panel.
Under learning, the impact responses are the same as those under RE because agents have
correct forecast functions initially. After the disappearance of the interest rate reduction, a
positive surprise in house prices induces an upward belief revision. Agents partially interpret
30Admittedly, this is a short-cut, but necessary way, to model the interest rate reduction in my context.
31Note the debt/GDP ratio here is percentage changes from the steady state value.
32The forecast error is dened as bqt   Et 1bqt:
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the surprise in house price forecasts as a permanent change in the parameters governing
the house price process. They become more optimistic about future house prices due to
both more optimistic beliefs and rising amounts of collateral holdings by borrowers. Credit
limit is relaxed based on the optimism. As can be seen from equation (34); borrowers
collateral holdings can rise if 1 
R
EPt bqt+1 > (1  )EPt 1bqt:With a larger borrowing capacity,
borrowers can repay the debt and increase investment in collateral holdings. Since aggregate
consumption is a constant fraction of borrowers collateral holdings, consumption follows
closely borrowerscollateral holdings.33 The debt/GDP ratio rises due to rising collateral
values.
In the period 2, house prices under learning are much higher relative to RE mainly due
to more optimistic expectation about future prices. The temporary decline in house prices
is due to the return of the interest rate to the steady state. Nevertheless, the realized price
is still higher than agentsprice forecast. So the realized price reinforces agentsoptimism,
which leads to further optimism when the price realization is used for belief updating. The
positive e¤ects of more optimistic beliefs and expectations can temporarily dominate the
negative e¤ect of debt repayment and lead to a rise in house prices. The dynamic feedback
between agentsbeliefs and actual prices through the relaxation of credit limits generates
prolonged periods of expansion of prices and quantities.
The reversal of prices and quantities relates to the convergence of the learning process in
section 4.2. At some point, the debt repayment becomes excessive such that its negative e¤ect
dominates and the realized house prices fall short of expectations. This sets a self-reinforcing
decline in motion. According to (32) and (33), agentsbeliefs are revised downward and
they become pessimistic. Credit limits are tightened based on the pessimism. Borrowers
housing demand falls, so does the realization of house prices. The realized house prices
reinforce agentsinitial pessimism, which generates further declines in prices and quantities.
Eventually prices and quantities converge to the steady state.
5.2 Boom and bust in house prices, debt and aggregate consump-
tion dynamics
Figure 5 contrasts predictions of the learning model and of the RE-I modelwith actual
data. Under RE, prices and quantities increase above their steady state values following
the real interest rate reduction. House prices continue to increase due to the persistence in
the user cost and the persistently low interest rates. They peak at about 14.4% above the
steady state. After the disappearance of the interest rate reduction, house price starts to
revert to their steady state. The RE model under-predicts considerably the levels of prices
and quantities.34
33See Online Appendix A for the analytical expressions for log-linearized consumption and debt/GDP
ratio.
34Given the pattern of the interest rates I consider, the response of house prices in the RE-Imodel will
be larger if the elasticity 1 is larger. The improvement of the performance of the RE model with a larger
1
 or a larger leverage ratio is limited when the leverage is not very large or close to 1 and the response of
consumption or the collateral holding transfer is not counterfactually large. Regardless of the value of these
two parameters, the REE house prices will revert when the interest rate starts to revert. So the RE model
cannot match the turning point of house prices.
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Figure 4: Response to 1% unexpected negative shock to interest rates
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Figure 5: Model Predictions of the RE-I Model, Learning Model and Actual Data
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The learning model predicts house prices, debt/GDP ratio and consumption rather well,
in particular during the price boom years. Following the real interest rate reduction, real
house prices under learning increase at a faster pace than under RE. The learning model
generates large additional amplication of prices and quantities relative to the RE version of
the model. The peak of the predicted house prices under learning is about 35.9% at 2006Q4,
which is about 2.5 times the peak response of under RE. The house price boom arises mainly
from more optimistic expectation about future prices due to both more optimistic beliefs
and the rising amount of collateral held by households. The rising household credit market
debt/GDP ratio is due to both the house price boom and the rising amount of collateral
held by households. The learning model also generates a consumption boom due to shifts of
collateral to more productive households. The peak response of consumption in the learning
model is 18.8%, which is twice as large as that in the RE model.
House prices in the RE-I modelstart to revert once the interest rate rises, while the
learning model matches rather well the turning point of house prices in the data. House
prices in the learning model rise further for a few quarters as in the data even after the rise
of the interest rates. This is due to belief revisions and the interaction of beliefs and price
realizations.
The forecast errors of the REmodel are constant during 2001Q1-2005Q4 and then become
zero afterwards. They are completely driven by and correspond to the pattern of exogenous
shifts in interest rates. In contrast, the learning model generates internal and positive persis-
tence in forecast errors. Gelain, Lansing, and Mendicino (2013) derived house price forecasts
from the future markets for the Case-Shiller house price index (where only the data from
2006 onwards are available) and showed that the future market tends to overpredict future
house prices when prices are falling.The learning model generates exactly this pattern of
forecast errors as one can see from the lower right panel of gure 5 that the real house price
forecast error becomes negative from 2006 onwards.
The model overpredicts the bust of house prices and the decline in the debt/GDP ratio
and consumption. Various policies responding to the nancial crisis and the Great Recession
since the year 2007, such as liquidity provision to the private sector, may have contributed
to the discrepancy between model predicted and actual prices. Associated with the price
bust was slow changing debt/GDP ratio in the data. One reason for the gap between model
predicted and actual debt/GDP ratio may be that borrowers cannot be forced to repay the
mortgages. Adding such asymmetric feature of the mortgage contracts as in Justiniano,
Primiceri and Tambalotti (2014) may help to explain the debt/GDP ratio during the price
reversal. Incorporating these factors is beyond the scope of the present paper and left for
future research.
In the learning model, agents evaluate the payo¤s of di¤erent strategies using the subjec-
tive probability measure. Online Appendix G shows that the collateral constraint is indeed
binding during the housing cycle over the year 2001-2008 in the learning model.
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Figure 6: Predictions of the RE-II Model with Anticipated Interest Rate Movement
5.3 RE price dynamics with anticipated interest rate movement
Figure 6 displays the RE-IImodel dynamics,35 i.e., when the low interest rates during
2001Q1-2005Q4 are anticipated by the agents. Except for the initial period, agents under-
stand the e¤ects of such structural change and could perfectly foresee the entire path of
prices and quantities given that there is no remaining uncertainty after the initial real rate
reduction. The real house prices jump immediately upward and then converge to the steady
state. This is inconsistent with the pattern of prices and quantities observed in the data. In
particular, the model does not generate persistent increases in house prices.
5.4 Dependence of the e¤ect of interest rates changes on loan-to-
Value (LTV) ratio
The section performs counterfactual analysis by reducing the LTV ratio and keeping other
parameters unchanged. Figure 7 displays the counterfactual simulation result under RE and
Learning model with LTV ratio of 40% (indicated by the line with diamonds and with cross,
respectively) together with the data (the line with +) and the result under the benchmark
RE and Learning model with LTV ratio 54% as in gure 5 (the line with oand the dashed
line, respectively).
The e¤ect of interest rates changes depends sensitively on the LTV ratio and the learning
model with this lower LTV ratio generates counterfactually much lower rise in house prices,
consumption and debt/GDP ratio. This suggests that if the LTV ratio were lower, much of
the house price boom could have been avoided.
35For simulating the model in such senario, I rstly solve the law of motion for prices and quantities during
2006Q1-2008Q4. Then with them I recursively solve backward the policy function until 2001Q1.
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Figure 7: Data and Results under Benchmark RE, Learning and Counterfactual
I use the standardized di¤erence between the peak response in the learning model and
that under RE as a crude measure of the degree of amplication.36 Table 1 reports the
amplication of house prices, debt/GDP ratio and consumption in the learning model relative
to the RE version of the model when the LTV ratio is varied in the interval [40%; 54%].
Interestingly, the amplication of the learning model is non-linear and increasing in the LTV
ratio. For example, the learning model generates 150%, 125%, and 100% larger peak response
of house prices, debt/GDP ratio, and consumption relative the RE model respectively when
the LTV ratio is 54%, while the counterpart is 41%, 33%, and 22% when the LTV ratio is
40%.
Table 1:Dependence of Amplication on LTV Ratio
Loan-to-Value Ratio
40% 43% 46% 49% 52% 54%
House prices 41% 45% 51% 61% 80% 150%
Debt/GDP ratio 33% 37% 42% 50% 67% 125%
Consumption 22% 25% 30% 38% 52% 100%
The result is in line with Proposition 6 which shows that a higher leveraged regime is
more prone to self-reinforcing uctuations. The weaker relationship between real interest
rates and house prices under a lower LTV ratio regime may be a reason why changes of
interest rates or monetary policy has a more muted e¤ect on house prices in some earlier
historical episodes featuring more stringent nancing constraints than today.37 It is poten-
36More precisely, amplication is calculated by the peak response under learning minus the peak response
under RE and then divided by the latter.
37For example, in the published discussion of Adam, Kuang, and Marcet (2011), Robert Gordon questioned
the mechanism of the AKM model based on the observation of a weaker relationship between interest rate
changes and house prices in those earlier episodes.
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tially interesting to explore this non-linear dependence on the leverage ratio to understand
economic volatilities of aggregate variables across regimes with di¤erent leverage ratios or in
cross-country comparisons.
6 Conclusion
The paper presents a model of housing and credit cycles which is consistent with the evidence
on economic agentsexpectations and can quantitatively account for the 2001-2008 U.S. boom
and bust in house prices and associated household debt and aggregate consumption dynamics.
The trigger of the price boom is the persistent fall in real interest rates after the year 2000.
The response of house prices and quantities are drastically amplied due to the comovement
and mutual reinforcement between agentsprice beliefs and house price realizations via credit
expansion/contraction. Positive (negative) development or surprise in house prices fuels
optimism (pessimism) and credit expansion (contraction), which in turn boost (dampen)
housing demand and house prices and reinforce agentsoptimism (pessimism).
The model also uncovers an important dependence of the uctuations of house prices and
quantities on the leverage ratio in a collateral-constrained economy, which is missing in the
RE analysis. It suggests that allowing for imperfect knowledge of agents, a higher leveraged
economy is more prone to self-reinforcing uctuations. In particular, the amplication of the
response of house prices and quantities to the interest rates changes in the learning model
relative to RE is non-linear and increasing in the leverage ratio of the economy. This gives
an additional rationale for reasonable capital requirement regulation to avoid an extremely
high leverage ratio regime which is prone to self-reinforcing uctuations and associated with
high economic volatilities.
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Online Appendix for A Model of Housing and Credit Cycles with Imperfect
Market Knowledge(Pei Kuang)
A Steady State, Log-linearization and the Actual Law
of Motion under Learning
The steady state of the interest rate, user cost of collateral, collateral prices, lenderscol-
lateral holdings, borrowerscollateral holdings, borrowing, and borrowersconsumption are
R = 1
L
; u = a
(1 ) , q =
aR
(R 1)(1 ) , H
L = G0 1( aR
1  ); H
B = H HL; bB = (1  )qHB=R and
cB = eHB. Recall the model equations
HBt =
a+ qt   (1  )EPt 1qt
qt   1Rt (1  )EPt qt+1
HBt 1 (39)
qt   1
Rt
EPt qt+1 =
G
0
(HLt )
Rt
(40)
Equation (39) implies

qt   1
Rt
(1  )EPt qt+1

HBt =

a+ qt   (1  )EPt 1qt

HBt 1
qtRt   (1  )EPt qt+1

HBt =

a+ qt   (1  )EPt 1qt

HBt 1Rt
Note a+q
q
= 1  1 
R
: Log-linearizing this equation yields
q [R  (1  )]HB bHBt +HB hRq bqt + bRt  (1  )qEPt bqt+1i
= (a+ q)RHB
 bRt + bHBt 1+RHB  qbqt   (1  )qEPt 1bqt
Further simplication yields

1  1  
R
 bHBt + bqt + bRt  1  R EPt bqt+1

=

1  1  
R
bRt + bHBt 1+  bqt   (1  )EPt 1bqt
Recall Rt = AtL ; so
bRt = bAt: This implies further
bHBt = 1 1  1 
R
  bqt   (1  )EPt 1bqt  bqt   1  R EPt bqt+1

+ bHBt 1  1 R 1  1 
R
 bAt (41)
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Now start with equation (40)
qt   1
Rt
EPt qt+1 =
G
0
(HLt )
Rt
() Rtqt   EPt qt+1 = G
0
(HLt ) (42)
Recall the denition of 1

=  G
00
(HL)HL
G0 (HL)
HB
HL
: Note log-linearizing HBt + H
L
t = H impliesbHLt =  HBHL bHBt :
Log-linearization of equation (42) leads to
Rq
bqt + bRt  qEPt bqt+1 = G00(HL)HL bHLt
=  G
00
(HL)HL
G0(HL)
HB
HL
G
0
(HL) bHBt
=
1

G
0
(HL) bHBt
=
1

q (R  1) bHBt
In the last equation, the steady state relationship, G
0  
HL

= q(R 1), is used. Simplication
further yields
1

bHBt = RR  1
bqt   1
R
EPt bqt+1 + bRt
Given that bRt = bAt; the above equation leads to
1

bHBt = RR  1
bqt   1
R
EPt bqt+1 + bAt (43)
Below the actual law of motion (ALM) for collateral prices is derived. Suppose the perceived
law of motion for collateral prices is bqt = mt + pt bHBt 1 + st bAt: Conditional expectations at
period t and t 1 for collateral prices are EPt bqt+1 = mt +pt bHBt and EPt 1bqt = mt 1+pt 1 bHBt 1:
Equation (41) can be simplied to
bHBt = 1 1  1 
R
 1  
R
EPt bqt+1   (1  )EPt 1bqt+ bHBt 1   1 R 1  1 
R
 bAt (44)
Combining (43) and (44) by eliminating bHBt , I get
bqt = 1EPt bqt+1   2EPt 1bqt + 3 bHBt 1 + 4 bAt
where 1 =
1
R
+ 1

R 1
R
1
1  1
R
(1 )
1 
R
, 2 = (1   ) 1 R 1R 11  1
R
(1 ) , 3 =
1

R 1
R
and 4 =  (1 +
1 
R
1  1
R
(1 )
1

R 1
R
).
Substituting conditional expectations into the last equation, I get
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bqt = 1 mt + pt bHBt   2 mt 1 + pt 1 bHBt 1+ 3 bHBt 1 + 4 bAt (45)
Substituting expectations into (43), I get
1

bHBt = RR  1
bqt   1
R

mt + 
p
t
bHBt + bAt
or alternatively
bHBt = bqt + bAt   1Rmt1

R 1
R
+ 1
R
pt
(46)
Combining (46) and (45) by eliminating bHBt , I get the ALM for collateral prices under
learning
bqt = T1(mt 1; mt ; pt ) + T2(pt 1; pt ) bHBt 1 + T3(pt ) bAt
where T1(
m
t 1; 
m
t ; 
p
t ) =
(1
m
t  2mt 1)(1+

p
t
3R
)  1
3
mt 
p
t
R
1+

p
t
3R
 1pt 13
, T2(
p
t 1; 
p
t ) =
3 2pt 1
1  1
p
t
3+
p
t
1
R
and T3(
p
t ) =
(4+
1
p
t
3+
1
R

p
t
)
1  1
p
t
3+
1
R

p
t
. Those expressions are used for proving the propositions and computations.
A.1 An alternative expression of the T2 map
In the paper, an alternative expression of the T2-map, i.e., T2(
p
t 1; 
p
t ) =
( 1R 
p
t+
1

R 1
R )

1  1 
1  1 
R
pt 1

1 
1 
R
1  1 
R
pt
;
is presented and used to illustrate some intuitions. Its derivation is provided here. I am only
interested in deriving the T2-map and keeping track of agentsbeliefs, so I consider a simpler
case without learning about 
m
and without shock bAt for the simplicity of expositions: The
T2-map in the full model with learning about the steady state and with stochastic innovations
will be the same as that in the simpler case.
Recall our model equations are (43) and (44) which contain three expectation terms.
Substituting conditional expectations into equation (44), we get
bHBt = 1 1  1 
R
 1  
R
EPt bqt+1   (1  )EPt 1bqt+ bHBt 1
=
1 
1  1 
R
 1  
R
pt bHBt   (1  )pt 1 bHBt 1+ bHBt 1
Note in the above equation pt comes from the down-payment and 
p
t 1 debt repayment. So
bHBt = 1  (1 )1  1 R pt 1
1  1 R
1  1 
R
pt
bHBt 1 (47)
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Substituting conditional expectations into equation (43)
bqt = 1
R
EPt bqt+1 + 1 R  1R bHBt
=
1
R
pt bHBt + 1 R  1R bHBt
=

1
R
pt +
1

R  1
R
 bHBt (48)
Note pt in the above equation arise from the housing re-sale price/value. Combining equation
(47) and (48) yields the T2-map used in the paper
bqt =  1
R
pt +
1

R  1
R
 1  (1 )
1  1 
R
pt 1
1  1 R
1  1 
R
pt
bHBt 1
From this equation, the three belief terms can be easily tracked. It can be shown that it is
identical to the T2-map derived earlier, i.e., T2(
p
t 1; 
p
t ) =
3 2pt 1
1  1
p
t
3+
p
t
1
R
:
A.2 Consumption and Debt/GDP ratio
Denote by Y the steady state value of aggregate output. Log-linearizing aggregate production
yields
byt = (a+ e) G0
(a+ e)
(a+ e)HB
Y
bHBt 1
It equals to the product of the productivity gap (a+e) G
0
(a+e)
between borrowers and lenders,
the production share of borrowers (a+e)H
B
Y
and the redistribution of collateral. Aggregate
consumption bct will be the same as aggregate output because of zero net investment in
housing:
Denote by C andGDP aggregate consumption and GDP at the steady state, respectively.
The log-linearized GDP is
\GDP t =
C
GDP
bct (49)
and the debt/GDP ratio is
( \Debt=GDP )t = bbBt  \GDP t (50)
= EPt bqt+1 +HBt   bRt   C
GDP
byt (51)
where bbBt can be calculated by the collateral constraint.
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B Derivation of the Bayesian Posterior Mean38
I assume the prior distribution of unknown parameters, i.e., the parameters linking prices and
fundamentals (m; p) and the residual precision K  1
2"
; is a Normal-Gamma distribution
as following
K  G(0; d 20 )
(m; p)0 j K = k  N((m0 ; p0)0; (0k) 1)
The prior distribution of K is a gamma distribution and the conditional prior of   (m; p)
given K is a multivariate normal distribution.
I drop the terms which do not involve (; k) by using the proportionality symbol. The
conditional probability of the collateral price is a normal distribution with following condi-
tional probability density function
p(ytj; k) / k 12 expf k
2
(yt   x0t)0(yt   x0t)g
The prior density of the parameters is following
p(; h) / kt 1 1expf d 2t 1kgk
1
2 expf k
2
(   t 1)0t 1(   t 1)g
I proceed to show that the posterior distribution of the parameters is as follows
jK = k  N(t; (tk) 1)
K  G(t; d 2t )
with probability density function
p(; kjyt) / kt 1expf d 2t kgk
1
2 expf k
2
(   t)0t(   t)g
where
t = t 1 + (xtx0t + t 1)
 1xt(yt   x0tt 1)
t = t 1 + xtx0t
t = t 1 +
1
2
d 2t = d
 2
t 1 +
1
2
(yt   x0tt 1)0(xtx0t + t 1) 1t 1(yt   x0tt 1)
The above equations can be derived using Bayeslaw. The derivations are standard so
only some critical intermediate steps are presented here. The posterior density
p(; kjyt) / p(ytj; k)p(; k)
38The derivation follows DeGroot (1974).
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It can be derived from the right hand side that the posterior mean of the parameters is
t
= (xtx
0
t + t 1)
 1(t 1t 1 + xtyt)
= (xtx
0
t + t 1)
 1t 1t 1 + (xtx0t + t 1)
 1xtyt
= t 1   (xtx0t + t 1) 1xtx0tt 1 + (xtx0t + t 1) 1xtyt
= t 1 + (xtx0t + t 1)
 1xt(yt   x0tt 1)
Note
(yt   x0t)0(yt   x0t) + (   t 1)0t 1(   t 1)
= y0tyt   20xtyt + 0xtx0t + 0t 1   20t 1t 1 + 0t 1tt 1
= 0(xtx0t + t 1)   20(xtyt + t 1t 1) + y0tyt + 0t 1t 1t 1
=
 
   (xtx0t + t 1) 1(t 1t 1 + xtyt)
0
(xtx
0
t + t 1)
 
   (xtx0t + t 1) 1(t 1t 1 + xtyt)

y0tyt + 
0
t 1t 1t 1   (t 1t 1 + xtyt)0(xtx0t + t 1) 1(t 1t 1 + xtyt)

C Deriving the Constant-Gain Learning Algorithm from
Bayesian Updating39
Agents perceive the following random walk model of coe¢ cient variation
t = t 1 + t Et
0
t = R1t (52)
yt = 
0
t 1xt + & t E& t&
0
t = R2t (53)
Dene Pt 1 = E[(t 1   t 1)(t 1   t 1)]. The prior belief about 0 are N(0; P0j0). The
posterior of t can be represented by the basic Kalman lter, which takes the form of following
recursions40
t = t 1 + Lt[yt   x0tt 1] (54)
Lt =
Ptjt 1xt
R2t + x0tPtjt 1xt
(55)
Pt+1jt = Ptjt 1  
Ptjt 1xtx0tPtjt 1
R2t + x0tPtjt 1xt
+R1t+1 (56)
Furthermore, agents are assumed to perceive R1t =
g
1 gPt 1jt 1 and R2t =
1
g
. Note
Ptjt 1 = Pt 1jt 1 +R1t = 11 gPt 1jt 1. Equations (55)  (56) become
t = t 1 + Lt[yt   x0t^t 1] (57)
Lt =
Pt 1jt 1xt
1 g
g
+ x0tPt 1jt 1xt
(58)
39The derivations follow Ljung (1991) and Sargent (1999) except that both of them use inconsistent
notations.
40Note for the model considered here I have tjt 1 = t 1jt 1, so I suppress the conditioned information
set and use t for both.
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And equation (54) becomes
Pt+1jt  R1t+1 = Ptjt 1  
Ptjt 1xtx0tPtjt 1
R2t + x0tPtjt 1xt
(59)
Ptjt =
1
1  g
"
Pt 1jt 1  
Pt 1jt 1xtx0tPt 1jt 1
x0tPt 1jt 1xt +
1 g
g
#
(60)
The constant gain learning algorithm is following41
t = t 1 + gR 1t xt(yt   
0
t 1xt) (61)
Rt = Rt 1 + g (xtx0t  Rt 1) (62)
Below I show the above two formulations are equivalent. Use R 1t  Ptjt, equation (62)
yields
R 1t =
 
(1  g)Rt 1 + gxtx0 1t

(63)
=
1
1  gR
 1
t 1  
1
1  gR
 1
t 1xt

x0t
1
1  gR
 1
t 1xt +
1
g
 1
x0t
1
1  gR
 1
t 1 (64)
=
1
1  g
"
Pt 1jt 1  
Pt 1jt 1xtx0tPt 1jt 1
x0tPt 1jt 1xt +
1 g
g
#
(65)
From equation (63) to equation (64), the matrix inversion formula is used and stated in
lemma 1 below. Specically, it is applied with A = (1  g)Rt 1, B = xt, C = g, D = x0t.
Now I proceed to show the equivalence between equation (57) and (61). It su¢ ces to
show that gR 1t xt = Lt.
gR 1t xt = gPtjtxt (66)
=
g
1  g
"
Pt 1jt 1  
Pt 1jt 1xtx0tPt 1jt 1
1 g
g
+ x0tPt 1jt 1xt
#
xt (67)
=
Pt 1jt 1xt
1 g
g
+ x0tPt 1jt 1xt
(68)
= Lt (69)
From equation (66) to (67), equation (60) is used.
Lemma 1. Let A, B, C and D be matrices of compatible dimensions, so that the product
BCD and the sum A+BCD exist. Then
[A+BCD] 1 = A 1   A 1B[DA 1B + C 1] 1DA 1 (70)
Proof: see Ljung and Soederstroem (1983) pp. 19. (Sketch: show the RHS of (70) multiplied
by A+BCD from the right is equal to identity matrix.)
41The learning rule using lagged data can be derived similarly as in Adam, Beutel and Marcet (2014).
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D Proof of Proposition 4
Local stability of the Minimum State Variable (MSV) RE solution is determined by the
stability of the following associated ordinary di¤erential equations (ODEs)
dm
d
= T1(
m; p)  m
dp
d
= T2(
p; p)  p
where T1(
m; p) =
(1
m 2m)(1+ 
p
3R
)  1
3
mp
R
1+ 
p
3R
 1p 13
, T2(
p; p) = 3 2
p
1  1p
3+
p 1
R
, 1 =
1
R
+ 1

R 1
R
1
1  1
R
(1 )
1 
R
,
2 = (1  ) 1 R 1R 11  1
R
(1 ) , 3 =
1

R 1
R
.
Solving the xed point of the T-map, I get m = 0, and p =
(1  1
R
(1 )) 1

1+(1 )( 1

  1
R
)
:
The E-stability condition requires that the eigenvalues of the Jacobian of the right hand
side of the above ODEs are negative. Since m does not show up in the ODE for p, the
eigenvalues will be on the diagonal of the Jacobian matrix and only two partial derivatives,
i.e., @T1(
m;p)
@m
jm=m;p=p and @T2(
p;p)
@p
jp=p , matter for the E-stability.
Fixing the arguments of the T2-map at 
p yields
T2(
p; p) =
3   2p
1  1p
3+
p 1
R
=
(3 +
p
R
)(3   2p)
3 + (
1
R
  1)p
=
23 + (
1
R
  2)p3   2R (p)2
3 + (
1
R
  1)p
The derivative of T2 with respect to 
p evaluated at the RE value is
@T2(
p; p)
@p
jp=p =
( 1
R
  2)3   
p 2
R
2
3 + (
1
R
  1)
p
 ( 1
R
  1)
(23 + (
1
R
  2)p3   2R (p)2)
3 + (
1
R
  1)
p
2
=
( 1
R
  2)3   
p 2
R
2
3 + (
1
R
  1)
p   ( 1
R
  1)

p
3 + (
1
R
  1)
p
=
( 1
R
  2)3   
p
( 2
R
2 +
1
R
  1)
3 + (
1
R
  1)
p (71)
Note 
p
is the xed point of the T2-map, i.e., 
p
=
23+(
1
R
 2)p3  2R (
p
)2
3+(
1
R
 1)p
; is used when deriving
the second equality above. Substituting for 1; 3; and 
p
; I show that the denominator of
the above derivative is positive.
38
3 + 
p
(
1
R
  1)
=
1

R  1
R
+

p
R

1 R

1
R
+
1

R  1
R
1
1  1
R
(1  )
1  
R

=
1

R  1
R
  (1 
1
R
(1  )) 1

1 + (1  )( 1

  1
R
)
1
R

1

R  1
R
1
1  1
R
(1  ) (1  )

=
1

R  1
R
1
R
 
R 
1

(1  )
1 + (1  )( 1

  1
R
)
!
=
1

R  1
R
1
R
 
R 
1

(1  )
1  1 
R
+ 1 

!
> 0 (72)
I proceed to show that the derivative (71) is smaller than 1. Given (72), note
@T2(
p; p)
@p
jp=p < 1
is equivalent to
(
1
R
  2)3   
p
(
2
R
2 +
1
R
  1) < 3 + (
1
R
  1)
p
Rearranging the above inequality yields
(
1
R
  2   1)3 < 2
p
(
2
R
+
1
R
  1)
Plugging 0s, it can be shown that the left hand side of the above inequality is negative
because 2 > 0;
1
R
  1 < 0; and 3 > 0: It can be shown that the right hand side is exactly
zero because 1 =
1
R
+ 2
R
.
Now I turn to the rst derivative. Recall T1(
m; p) =
1
m 2m(1+ 
p
3R
)
1+ 
p
3R
 1p 13
. Taking the
derivative of T1 with respect to 
m and evaluate it at the RE belief yields
@T1(
m; p)
@m
jm=m;p=p =
1   2(1 + 
p
3R
)
1 + 
p
3R
  1
p 1
3
=
(1   2)3R  2
p
3R + 
p
(1  1R)
I then show the above derivative is smaller than 1. Given (72), it is equivalent to show
(1   2)3R  2
p
< 3R + 
p
(1  1R)
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Rearranging the above inequality yields
(1   2   1)3R < (2 + 1  1R)
p
(73)
Plugging in the parameters, it can be shown rstly the left hand side of the above inequality
is negative because
1   2   1 =
1
R
+
2
R
  2   1
=

1
R
  1

(1 + 2)
< 0
3 > 0; and R > 0: It can also be shown that the right hand side of (73) is zero because
1R = 1 + 2:
E Proof of Proposition 6
Dene s(pt ) =
1
p
t
3+
p
t
1
R
: Recall the T2-map is
T2(
p
t 1; 
p
t ) =
3   2pt 1
1  1pt
3+
p
t
1
R
=
3   2pt 1
1  s(pt )
' p +

  @T2
@pt 1
jpt 1=p;pt=p


p   pt 1

 

@T2
@pt
jpt 1=p;pt=p


p   pt

where   @T2
@pt 1
jp and @T2@pt jp stand for  
@T2
@pt 1
jpt 1=p;pt=p and
@T2
@pt
jpt 1=p;pt=p ; respectively.
A su¢ cient condition to guarantee momentum in belief is
  @T2
@pt 1
jp 
@T2
@pt
jp (74)
Suppose pt 1 < 
p
t  p; then p   pt 1 > 
p   pt  0: Given that the momentum
condition (74) holds, we have

  @T2
@pt 1
jpt 1=p

pt 1   
p

>

@T2
@pt
jpt=p


p   pt

and
hence T2(
p
t 1; 
p
t ) > 
p
: Using the belief updating rule, agents will update their belief upward,
i.e., pt+1 > 
p
t : Similarly, if 
p
t 1 > 
p
t  p; we have T2(pt 1; pt ) < 
p
and pt+1 < 
p
t :
I proceed to calculate the two derivatives. We have
  @T2
@pt 1
jp =
2
1  s(p)
and
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@T2
@pt
jp =
3   2
p
1  s(p)
s0(
p
)
1  s(p)
= 
p s0(
p
)
1  s(p)

p
is the xed point of the T2 map, i.e., 3 2
p
1 s(p) = 
p
; is used in the last equality. So the
condition (74) is equivalent to  2
1 s(p)  
p s0(p)
1 s(p) or
2  
p
s0(
p
) (75)
Calculating the derivative s0(
p
) as follows
s0(
p
) =
1
3 + 
p 1
R
  1
p
3 + 
p 1
R
1
R
3 + 
p 1
R
=
s(
p
)

p  
s(
p
) 1
R
3 + 
p 1
R
So

p
s0(
p
) = s(
p
)  
p
s(
p
) 1
R
3 + 
p 1
R
=
s(
p
)3
3 + 
p 1
R
=
s(
p
)(R  1)
(R  1) + p (76)
The last equality comes from plugging in the expression for 3: Below we use again that 
p
is the xed point of the T2 map, i.e., 3 2
p
1 s(p) = 
p
; which implies that
s(
p
) = 2 + 1 
3

p (77)
The inequality (75)
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2  
p
s0(
p
)
() 2 
s(
p
)(R  1)
(R  1) + p (using (76) )
() 2 

2 + 1 
3

p

(R  1)
(R  1) + p (using (77))
() 2  2
(R  1)
(R  1) + p +

1  3

p

(R  1)
(R  1) + p
() 2

p
(R  1) + p 

1  3

p

(R  1)
(R  1) + p
() 2
p 

1  3

p

(R  1)
() (1  )1

R  1
R
1
1  1
R
(1  )
(1  1
R
(1  )) 1

1 + (1  )( 1

  1
R
)

0B@1  1 R 1R
(1  1
R
(1 )) 1

1+(1 )( 1

  1
R
)
1CA (R  1) (using expressions for 2; p and 3)
() (1  )
1

R 1
R
1 + (1  )( 1

  1
R
)

0@1  R 1R

1 + (1  )( 1

  1
R
)

(1  1
R
(1  ))
1A (R  1)
() (1  )
R + (1  )(R  ) 
(1  1
R
(1  ))  R 1
R

1 + (1  )( 1

  1
R
)

(1  1
R
(1  )) (78)
The right hand side of the above inequality is
RHS =
(1  1
R
(1  ))  R 1
R

1 + (1  )( 1

  1
R
)

(1  1
R
(1  ))
=
1  1
R
+ 1
R
   1 + 1
R
  R 1
R
(1  )( 1

  1
R
)
1
R
(R  (1  ))
=
1  1
R
+ 1
R
   1 + 1
R
  R 1
R
(1  )( 1

  1
R
)
1
R
(R  (1  ))
=
R   (R  1) (1  )(R  )
R(R  (1  )) (79)
So with equation (79) the inequality (78) becomes
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(1  )
R + (1  )(R  ) 
R   (R  1) (1  )(R  )
R(R  (1  ))
() (1  )R
2   R(1  )2
R + (1  )(R  )  R   (R  1) (1  )(R  )
() (1  )R2   R(1  )2  R22 + R(1  )(R  )
 R (R  1) (1  )(R  )  (R  1) (1  )2(R  )2
() (1  )R2   R(1  )2  R22  R22(1  )
+R(1  )(R  )  R(1  )2(R  )
 R (R  1) (1  )(R  )  (R  1) (1  )2(R  )2
()  
(R  )2(R  1)  R + R(R  )(1  )2
+
 
R2 +R22   R2 + 2R + (R  1) (R  )R (1  )
 R22
 0 (80)
I proceed to simplify the inequality (80). Note the coe¢ cient on (1   )2 in inequality
(80) is
(R  )2(R  1)  R + R(R  ) =  R2   2R + 2R   R2   2R + 2  R + R2   2R
= R3   R2 + R R2   2
= R2(R  1)  R(R  1)  2
The coe¢ cient on (1  ) in inequality (80) is
R2 +R22   R2 + 2R + (R  1) (R  )R = R2(R  1)  2R (R  1) +R22 + 2R
= R(R(R  1) + 2)
So the inequality (80) is equivalent to
0  (R2(R  1)  R(R  1)  2)(1  )2 +R(R(R  1) + 2)(1  ) R22
() 0   2  (1  )2   2R(1  ) +R2
+
 
R2(R  1)(1   R(R  1)(1  )2) +R2(R  1)(1  )2
() 0   2 (R  (1  ))2 +R(R  1)(1  )(R  (1  )) +R2(R  1)(1  )2
() ((R  (1  ))  R(R  1)(1  )
2
)2  R2(1  )2

(R  1) + (R  1)
2
4

(81)
43
Case 1: assuming (R  (1  )) > R(R 1)(1 )
2
or equivalently
2(R  (1  ))
R(R  1)(1  ) >
1

(82)
(81) implies
(R  (1  ))  R(R  1)(1  )
2
 R(1  )
r
(R  1) + (R  1)
2
4
() 1

 R  (1  )
R(R 1)(1 )
2
+R(1  )
q
(R  1) + (R 1)2
4
() 1


R
1    1
g(R)
(83)
where g(R) = R
r
(R  1) + (R  1)
2
4
+
R(R  1)
2
Combining (82) and (83), I get
2(R  (1  ))
R(R  1)(1  ) >
1


R
1    1
g(R)
(84)
It can be shown that
2(R  (1  ))
R(R  1)(1  ) >
R
1    1
R
q
(R  1) + (R 1)2
4
+ R(R 1)
2
()
R
(1 )   1
R(R 1)
2
>
R
1    1
R
q
(R  1) + (R 1)2
4
+ R(R 1)
2
because the second inequality is true.
Case 2: assuming (R (1 ))  R(R 1)(1 )
2
or equivalently 1

 (R (1 ))R(R 1)(1 )
2
;(81) implies
R(R  1)(1  )
2
  (R  (1  ))  R(1  )
r
(R  1) + (R  1)
2
4
Note R(R 1)(1 )
2
< R(1  )
q
(R  1) + (R 1)2
4
; so the above inequality holds: I get
1

 (R  (1  ))
R(R 1)(1 )
2
(85)
Combining (84) and (85), I get the momentum condition 1 
R
 1
g(R) 1

+1
where g(R) =
R(
q
(R  1) + (R 1)2
4
+ R 1
2
):
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F Robustness of the Qualitative Model Dynamics to
an Alternative Specication of the Collateral Con-
straint
Some papers, say Boz and Mendoza (2013) use an alternative specication of collateral con-
straints that household borrowing is limited by a fraction of current collateral values rather
than the expected liquidation value of collateral. This section shows that the qualitative
dynamics, belief changes have a critical e¤ect on collateral prices and the possibility of mo-
mentum dynamics, continues to hold in the model with this alternative specication of the
collateral constraint.
Consider the following collateral constraint
bBt  (1  )
qt
R
HBt
The debt repayment is now (1   )qt 1HBt 1 and still depends directly on agents price
elasticity belief at t  1;i.e., pt 1: Borrowerscollateral demand becomes
HBt =
a+ qt   (1  )qt 1
qt   1R(1  )qt
HBt 1
Consider the deterministic case and without learning about the steady state. The collat-
eral demand equation is
HBt =
a+ qt   (1  )qt 1
qt   (1 )R qt
HBt 1
The model equations with the alternative specication of the collateral constraint contain
bHBt = 1 1  1 
R
 1  
R
bqt   (1  )bqt 1+ bHBt 1 (86)
bqt = 1
R
EPt bqt+1 + 1 R  1R bHBt (87)
Agentsconditional expectations are EPt bqt+1 = pt bHBt : Substituting the conditional expecta-
tions into the model equations, we get
bqt = 1
R
EPt bqt+1 + 1 R  1R bHBt
=
1
R
pt bHBt + 1 R  1R bHBt
=

1
R
pt +
1

R  1
R
 bHBt (88)
So we have bqt 1 =  1
R
pt 1 +
1

R  1
R
 bHBt 1 (89)
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Combining equations (86), and (89), we get
bHBt = 1 1  1 
R
 1  
R
bqt   (1  )bqt 1+ bHBt 1
=
1 
R
1  1 
R

1
R
pt +
1

R  1
R
 bHBt   1   1  1 
R
  1
R
pt 1 +
1

R  1
R
 bHBt 1 + bHBt 1
So
bHBt = 1  1 (1  1 R )

1
R
pt 1 +
1

R 1
R

1  1 R
1  1 
R

1
R
pt +
1

R 1
R
 bHBt 1 (90)
Equations (88) and (90) yield the ALM for collateral prices under learning
bqt =  1
R
pt +
1

R  1
R
 bHBt
= T2
 
pt 1; 
p
t
 bHBt 1
where
T2
 
pt 1; 
p
t

=

1
R
pt +
1

R  1
R
 1  1 
(1  1 R )

1
R
pt 1 +
1

R 1
R

1  1 R
1  1 
R

1
R
pt +
1

R 1
R

The actual price elasticity under learning, i.e., the T2 map, depends positively on cur-
rent beliefs and negatively on past beliefs. So the qualitative learning dynamics under this
alternative collateral constraint is similar to the one analyzed in the text.
G Check if the Collateral Constraint is Binding
Similar to the Kiyotaki andMoore (1997) paper, two assumptions: (1) B < 
L
A
(2) e
1  1
R
(1 )
(R 1)(1 )
aR
>
1
B
  1, have been made to ensure that the return to investment is higher than that to con-
sumption and saving in a neighborhood of the steady state, so that the collateral constraint
is always binding under RE. In the learning model agents evaluate the payo¤s of di¤erent
strategies using the subjective probability measure and there may be substantial deviations
of beliefs and expectations. It is unclear that if the collateral constraint remains binding
in this case without a formal check. This section conrms that the collateral constraint is
indeed binding during the housing cycle over the year 2001-2008 in the learning model.
Consider a marginal unit of tradable consumption at date t where t runs from 2001Q1
to 2008Q4. The borrower could consume it and get utility 1. Alternatively he could invest
it in collateral holding or save it and then invest. The payo¤ sequences for period t; t+ 1; t+
2; t+ 3; ::: would be as follows.
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invest 0,
e
dt
,
a+ qt+1   (1  )EPt qt+1
dt
e
dt+1
;
a+ qt+1   (1  )EPt qt+1
dt
a+ qt+2   (1  )EPt+1qt+2
dt+1
e
dt+2
; ::: (91)
save 0, 0, Rt
e
dt+1
;
Rt
a+ qt+2   (1  )EPt+1qt+2
dt+1
e
dt+2
; :::: (92)
consume 1, 0, 0, 0,... (93)
In period t, the borrower invests 1 unit and can get 1
dt
unit of collateral with borrowing. In
period t+1; he gets the production a+e
dt
: The non-tradable part e
dt
will be consumed and the
tradable part a
dt
will be re-invested. There will be capital gain
 
qt+1   (1  )EPt qt+1

1
dt
: In
period t+1; the sum of the tradable part and the capital gain, i.e., a+qt+1 (1 )E
P
t qt+1
dt
; will
be reinvested, so a+qt+1 (1 )E
P
t qt+1
dt
1
dt+1
will be acquired in period t + 1. In period t + 2;
a+qt+1 (1 )EPt qt+1
dt
e
dt+1
will be consumed; and so on.
In period t, if the borrower saves the 1 unit, then he will get Rt in period t + 1. He
can acquire Rt
dt+1
at the same period. In period t + 2; he consumes Rt edt+1 and invests
Rt
a+qt+2 (1 )EPt+1qt+2
dt+1
; and so on.
Denote P It ; P
S
t the payo¤ of the investment and saving strategy at period t; respectively.
Invt and Savt stand for the discounted sum of period payo¤s for the investment and saving
strategy, respectively. So
Invt =
1X
i=t
 
B
i
P It (94)
Savt =
1X
i=t
 
B
i
P St (95)
The steady state value of Invt is
Inv = 0 + B
e
d
+
 
B
2 a+ q
d
e
d
+
 
B
3a+ q
d
2
e
d
+ :::
= B
e
d

1 + B +
 
B
2
+ :::

= B
e
d
1
1  B
and the steady state value of Savt is
Sav =
 
B
2
R
e
d
+
 
B
3
R
e
d
+
 
B
4
R
e
d
+ :::
=
 
B
2
R
e
d
1
1  B
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To ensure a higher payo¤ for the investment strategy than that for saving at the steady
state, i.e., Inv > Sav, we need 1 > BR or L > B: And
B
e
d
1
1  B > 1 (96)
is su¢ cient to ensure that the payo¤ for investment is higher than that for consuming it
immediately. Substituting the steady state values, I get the inequality (96) is equivalent to
e
1  1
R
(1  )
(R  1) (1  )
aR
>
1
B
  1
Note Invt and Savt depend on the realization of future variables such as future prices.
We are going to compare the conditional expectation of the payo¤s of the three strategies
at period t, EPt Invt and E
P
t Savt: After log-linearization, E
P
t
dInvt and EPt dSavt are identical
to the log-linearization version of the discounted sum of the following payo¤ sequences42,
respectively
invest 0,
e
dt
,
a+ EPt qt+1
dt
e
EPt dt+1
;
a+ EPt qt+1
dt
; ::: (97)
save 0, 0, Rt
e
EPt dt+1
; Rt
a+ EPt qt+2
EPt dt+1
e
EPt dt+2
; :::: (98)
where I replaced qt+1 (1 )EPt qt+1; qt+2 (1 )EPt+1qt+2::: in (91) and (92) by EPt qt+1; EPt qt+2:::
in (97) and (98). I also replaced future down-payments dt+1; dt+2; ::: by EPt dt+1; E
P
t dt+2; ::::
Note at the steady state q
d
= 1
1  1 
R
: Log-linearizing the discounted sum of the payo¤
sequences (97) and (98) yields
Inv  EPt dInvt = B ed  bdt+  B2 ed

 bdt + 
1  1 
R
EPt bqt+1   EPt bdt+1
+
 
B
3 e
d

 bdt + 
1  1 
R
 
EPt bqt+1 + EPt bqt+2  EPt bdt+1   EPt bdt+2
+
 
B
4 e
d
[ bdt   EPt bdt+1   EPt bdt+2   EPt bdt+3
+

1  1 
R
 
EPt bqt+1 + EPt bqt+2 + EPt bqt+3]
+:::
=  B e
d
1
1  B [
bdt   B 
1  1 
R
EPt bqt+1 + 1X
i=1
 
B
i
EPt bdt+i
 B 
1  1 
R
1X
i=1
 
B
i
EPt bqt+i+1] (99)
42Note this does not mean that the conditional expectation of the payo¤ sequence (91) and (92) are (97)
and (98), respectively.
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and
Sav  EPt dSavt =  B2Red  bRt   EPt bdt+1
+
 
B
3
R
e
d
 bRt   EPt bdt+1   EPt bdt+2 + qd EPt bqt+2
+
 
B
4
R
e
d
[ bRt   EPt bdt+1   EPt bdt+2   EPt bdt+3
+
q
d
EPt bqt+2 + qd EPt bqt+3] + :::
=
 
B
2
R
e
d
1
1  B  bRt   1X
i=1
 
B
i 1
EPt bdt+i + qd
1X
i=1
 
B
i
EPt bqt+i+1
!
(100)
Log-linearizing the down-payment yields
bdt = 1
1  1 
R
bqt   1  
R

EPt bqt+1   bRt
and for i  1
EPt bdt+i = 11  1 
R

EPt bqt+i   1  R EPt bqt+i+1   EPt bRt+i

Dene {t  ({mt ;{pt )0 where {mt and {pt are parameter estimates in the collateral holding
equation. rt stands for agentsbelief for interest rates at period t and is assumed to be
updated via steady state learning for simplicity. {t and rt are updated recursively as follows
{t = {t 1 + 
 
SHt
 1 1bHBt 2
 bHBt 1   1 bHBt 2{t 1
SHt = S
H
t 1 + 

1bHBt 2

1 bHBt 2  SHt 1
rt = 
r
t 1 + 
 bRt 1   rt 1
where  is the gain parameter.
We derive the collateral price forecast when i  1
EPt bqt+i = mt + ptEPt bHBt+i
= mt + 
p
t
 
{mt
1  ({pt )i
1  {pt
+ ({pt )
i 1 bHBt
!
Substituting the conditional expectations and the down-payments into (99) and (100),
we get
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Inv  EPt dInvt =  B ed 11  B [bdt   B 1  1 R EPt bqt+1 +
1X
i=1
 
B
i
EPt bdt+i
 B 
1  1 
R
1X
i=1
 
B
i
EPt bqt+i+1]
=  B e
d
1
1  B [
bdt   B 
1  1 
R
EPt bqt+1
+
1X
i=1
 
B
i 1
1  1 
R

EPt bqt+i   1  R EPt bqt+i+1   EPt bRt+i

 B 
1  1 
R
1X
i=1
 
B
i
EPt bqt+i+1]
=  B e
d
1
1  B [
bdt + B (1  )
1  1 
R
EPt bqt+1
+
 
B   1
R

(1  )
1  1 
R
1X
i=1
 
B
i
EPt bqt+i+1
+
1 
R
1  1 
R
1X
i=1
 
B
i
EPt bRt+i] (101)
where the sum
P1
i=1
 
B
i
EPt bqt+i+1 can be calculated as follows
1X
i=1
 
B
i
EPt bqt+i+1 = 1X
i=1
 
B
i 
mt + 
p
t
 
{mt
1  ({pt )i
1  {pt
+ ({pt )
i bHBt
!!
=
1X
i=1
 
B
i
mt +
pt{mt
1  {pt

+
1X
i=1
 
B{pt
i bHBt   {mt {pt pt1  {pt

and the interest rate forecast
EPt bRt+i = rt
Comparing (99) with (100), we get
Sav  EPt dSavt =  B2Red 11  B
 bRt   1X
i=1
 
B
i 1
EPt bdt+i + qd
1X
i=1
 
B
i
EPt bqt+i+1
!
=
 
B
2
R
e
d
1
1  B
bRt
+R

Inv  EPt dInvt + B ed 11  B bdt    B2 ed 11  BEPt bqt+1

50
Denote 1t and 
2
t the di¤erence of the payo¤ between the investment strategy and the
saving and the consumption strategy, respectively, so
1t = E
P
t
dInvt + log (Inv)  EPt dSavt + log(Sav)
and
2t = E
P
t
dInvt + log (Inv)  1
The parameterization in the quantitative section is used. In addition, we need to set a few
more parameters. A di¤erent and smaller gain parameter  = 0:03 is considered for updating
{t and rt rather than 0.065 used in updating parameters in the collateral price equation.
This is because  =0.065 will lead to {pt larger than 1, which we want to avoid. The discount
factor B is set to 0:97: Numerical calculation shows that 1t and 
2
t are positive over the
housing cycle in the learning model over the year 2001-2008. 43
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